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our argument, we introduce an original data set of 2,685 foreign policy deliberations between US presidentsand their advisers from 1947 to 1988. Applying a novel machine learning approach to estimatethehawkishness of 1,134 Cold War–era foreign policy decision makers, we show that adviser-level hawkishnessaffects both the counsel that advisers provide in deliberations and the decisions leaders make: conflictual

policy choices grow more likely as hawks increasingly dominate the debate, even when accountingfor

leader dispositions. The theory and findings enrich our understanding of international conflict bydemonstrating how advisers’ dispositions, which aggregate through the counsel advisers provide,

systematically shape foreign policy behavior.

2. 秩序 的底 层： 国际 秩序 建构 中的 种族 （ The Underside of Order: Race intheConstitution of International Order）

Owen R. Brown，斯克里普斯学院政治系全球政治客座助理教授

【摘要】虽然越来越多的人认识到种族在塑造全球政治中的作用，但国际秩序的构建和运作与种族的纠缠程度仍未得到充分探究。本文通过理论化种族和国际秩序之间的构成联系，展示如何将二者视为相互交织的，为理解国际秩序的构建和运作中种族与种族化的重要性提供了理论支持。首先，本文将国际秩序和种族的概念化，其中种族的核心在于调控与规范化的过程中。其次，将二者结合起来，指出种族应被视为一种秩序形式，其作用是在各种空间和背景下再生历史性的等级和统治形式。第三，通过概念化和历史化种族化和种族化的国际秩序的一些关键特征，尤其是殖民性、种族国家和种族资本主义，以此说明这一秩序的持久性。将种族置于国际秩序研究的中心位置，可以帮助我们更好地理解种族化的等级和种族化的不平等如何在现实中持续存在，并通过国际秩序的结构和实践得到再生产。【原文】While there is increasing recognition of the role of race in shaping global politics, the extent towhich the construction and operation of international order is entangled with race remains underexplored. Inthis article, I argue for the centrality of race and racialization in understanding the constitutionof

international order by theorizing the constitutive connections between race and international order andshowing how the two can be examined as intertwined. I do this, first, by articulating conceptualizations of

both international order and race that center on processes of regulation and regularization. Second, I bringthese together to suggest that race be understood as a form of order that functions to reproduce a historicallyemergent form of hierarchy and domination across a range of spaces and contexts. Third, I operationalizethese conceptualizations by outlining and historicizing some of the key features of this racializedandracializing international order, specifically coloniality, the racial state, and racial capitalism, and therebyillustrate important aspects of the persistence of this order. Centering race in the study of international order,

I suggest, helps us better understand how racializing hierarchies and racialized inequalities persist inthepresent and are reproduced through structures and practices of international order.

3. 移民态度的经济决定因素：来自欧洲的企业层面证据（Economic DeterminantsofAttitudes Toward Migration: Firm-level Evidence from Europe）

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Leonardo Baccini，麦吉尔大学政治学系副教授

Magnus Lodefalk，厄勒布鲁大学商学院副教授与高级讲师

Radka Sabolová，厄勒布鲁大学商学院博士后研究员

【摘要】移民的分配后果是什么？它们如何影响对移民的态度？在本文中，我们利用了前利比亚独裁者穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲被赶下台后产生的自然实验，这导致了非洲国家经济移民史无前例地涌入欧洲。低技能劳动力的激增使低生产率企业受益，因为它们降低了生产成本并扩大了劳动力供应。采用三重差异设计，我们记录了西欧地区对移民的态度变得更加积极，因为西欧地区有大量移民和低生产率企业。来自瑞典的证据提供了精细的地理数据，证实了这些发现。然后，我们测试了这种态度转变的经济微观基础。我们表明，在移民流量较大的地区，低技能劳动力供应的激增使低生产率企业的盈利能力提高得更多。我们没有发现任何证据表明移民恶化了当地人的劳动力市场状况。【原文】What are the distributional consequences of migration, and how do they affect attitudes towardmigration? In this paper we leverage a natural experiment generated by the ousting of former Libyan dictator

Muammar Gaddafi, which created an unprecedented influx of economic migrants from African countries toEurope. This surge of low-skilled labor benefited low-productivity firms by lowering their productioncostsand expanding their labor supply. Employing a triple difference-in-differences design, we document that

attitudes toward migration became more positive in Western European regions with large shares of migrantsand low-productivity firms. Evidence from Sweden, which provides finely grained geographical data,

confirms these findings. We then test the economic microfoundations of this attitudinal shift. We showthat

the surge in the supply of low-skilled labor increased the profitability of low-productivity firms moreinareas that experienced larger migration flows. We find no evidence that migration worsened natives’ labor

market conditions.

4. “那…又怎么说”主义外交与美国外交政策态度（The Diplomacy of Whataboutismand US Foreign Policy Attitudes）

Wilfred M. Chow，香港大学政治与公共行政学系助理教授和宁波诺丁汉大学国际研究学院助理教授Dov H. Levin，香港大学政治与公共行政学系教授

【摘要】 “那…又怎么说”主义在全球事务中有效吗？当国家面临国际批评时，它们通常会以“那…又怎么说”主义作为回应：指责批评者也犯有类似的错误。尽管“那…又怎么说”主义在政策讨论中很普遍，但它仍然是一种研究不足的影响策略。本研究调查了国家如何利用“那…又怎么说”主义来塑造美国公众对各种国际问题的看法。我们通过调查实验发现，“那…又怎么说”主义通过减少公众对美国立场的认可和对惩罚行动的支持来减轻批评的负面影响。引用类似、近期不当行为的“那…又怎么说”主义批评更能塑造舆论。然而，“那…又怎么说”主义国家的身份并不显著影响这一策略的有效性。美国的反击信息往往无法削弱“那…又怎么说”主义的影响。这些结果表明，“那…又怎么说”主义可以成为国际关系中一种强有力的修辞工具，值得国际关系学者给予更多关注。【原文】Does whataboutism work in global affairs? When states face international criticism, theyoftenrespond with whataboutism: accusing their critics of similar faults. Despite its prevalence in policy

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discussions, whataboutism remains an understudied influence strategy. This study investigates howstatesuse whataboutism to shape American public opinion across various international issues. We find, usingsurvey experiments, that whataboutism mitigates the negative impacts of criticism by reducing publicapproval of US positions and backing for punitive actions. Whataboutist critiques referencing similar, recent

misdeeds have more power to shape opinions. However, the identity of the whataboutist state does not

significantly affect effectiveness. US counter-messaging often fails to diminish the effects of whataboutism.

These results show that whataboutism can be a potent rhetorical tool in international relations andthat it

warrants greater attention from international relations scholars.

5. 冲突期间讨好平民：来自阿富汗塔利班法官的证据（Courting Civilians DuringConflict: Evidence from Taliban Judges in Afghanistan）

Donald Grasse，芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院客座讲师

Renard Sexton，埃默里大学政治学系的助理教授

Austin Wright，芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院助理教授

【摘要】叛军经常提供公共服务，尤其是法律服务，但此类服务的后果尚不清楚。我们认为，叛军法庭可以通过增加叛乱的合法性、在叛军统治中创造既得利益或使叛军能够胁迫平民，来增加平民对叛乱的支持并增强攻击能力。我们使用轨迹平衡设计，利用跨地区和随时间变化的与塔利班法庭接触的差异，来研究塔利班司法系统的影响。我们发现，叛军法庭减少了平民对政府的支持，增加了对塔利班的支持，并且与更多的袭击和更多的联军伤亡有关。通过探索机制，我们发现法庭解决了平民之间的重大人际纠纷，但也促进了叛乱分子对平民的更多恐吓，而且公众舆论的变化不太可能仅仅由社会期望偏见驱动。我们的研究结果有助于解释叛军法庭的逻辑，并凸显了弱国中战争与建制机构发展之间的复杂相互作用。

【原文】Rebels regularly provide public services, especially legal services, but the consequences of suchprograms are unclear. We argue that rebel courts can boost civilian support for insurgency and augment

attack capacity by increasing the legitimacy of the rebellion, creating a vested interest in rebel rule, or

enabling rebel coercion of the civilian population. We study the impact of the Taliban's judiciarybyleveraging cross-district and over-time variation in exposure to Taliban courts using a trajectory-balancingdesign. We find that rebel courts reduced civilian support for the government and increased it for the Taliban,

and were associated with more attacks and more coalition casualties. Exploring mechanisms, we findthat

courts resolved major interpersonal disputes between civilians but also facilitated more insurgent

intimidation of civilians, and that changes in public opinion are unlikely to have been driven solely bysocial

desirability bias. Our findings help explain the logic of rebel courts and highlight the complex interactionsbetween warfare and institutional development in weak states.

6. 初步参证是否能增加公众对欧洲法律的支持？来自德国的实验证据（Do PreliminaryReferences Increase Public Support for European Law? Experimental Evidencefrom

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Germany）

Sivaram Cheruvu，德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校经济，政治与政策科学学院的政治学助理教授Jay N. Krehbiel，西弗吉尼亚大学政治学系副教授

【摘要】长期以来，关于欧盟及其法律体系成功扩张和巩固的解释一直强调国内法院向欧洲法院提交初步参证的重要性。许多此类理论解释的关键在于，国内法院比欧洲法院更有能力强制各国政府遵守欧盟法律。我们将比较司法政治文献中的见解整合到欧盟初步参证制度的背景下，为这一说法提供了理论和实证基础，认为将国内法院纳入欧盟法律程序可增强公众对欧盟法律广泛司法解释的支持。然而，我们继续指出，这种合法性的转移取决于公民对国家和欧洲法院的看法。我们用在德国进行的一项预先注册的调查实验的证据来支持我们的论点。

【原文】Explanations for the successful expansion and consolidation of the European Union and its legal

system have long emphasized the importance of domestic courts’ sending preliminary references totheCourt of Justice. Key to many of these theoretical accounts is the claim that domestic courts are better

equipped than the Court of Justice to compel national governments to comply with EUlaw. Integratinginsights from the comparative judicial politics literature into the context of the EU's preliminary referencessystem, we provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim by arguing that incorporatingdomestic courts into the EU legal process enhances public support for expansive judicial interpretations of

EU law. We go on to argue, however, that this transfer of legitimacy depends on citizens’ views of thenational and European courts. We support our argument with evidence from a preregistered surveyexperiment fielded in Germany.

【编译：朱嘉成】【责任编辑：封欣怡】

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《冲突解决杂志》（Journal of Conflict Resolution）Journal of Conflict Resolution， Vol.68, No.5, May 2024

1. 失败国家或弱国是否有利于当地恐怖组织的生存？（Do Failed or Weak States FavorResident Terrorist Groups’ Survival?）

Khusrav Gaibulloev，沙迦美国大学工商管理学院经济系教授

James A. Piazza，宾夕法尼亚州立大学政治学系教授

Todd Sandler，德克萨斯大学达拉斯分校经济、政治与政策科学学院名誉教授【摘要】通过采用两种不同的国家失败度量标准，我们研究了国家的弱点如何影响本土恐怖组织的生存。从理论上讲，国家失败有利于本土恐怖组织的生存，而国家领土控制则促进本土恐怖组织的消亡，直到达到某个控制阈值。从实证上讲，通过考虑本土恐怖组织的生存前景，我们发现一个国家脆弱性与其对恐怖主义的控制之间存在着稳固的负相关关系。这种关系经受住了一系列稳固性测试的检验，例如，替代估计和样本。我们应用了一个旨在解决内生性问题的工具。特别是，我们为失败的国家设计的新工具包括自然灾害和族群分化的交互作用。随着一个国家的领土控制百分比的增加，本土恐怖组织更倾向于结束，直到达到某个控制百分比阈值。我们的分析可以通过利用这里识别的促进失败国家中本土组织终结的细致理论决定因素来指导反恐政策。

【原文】Employing two alternative measures of state failure, we investigate how state weakness influencesresident terrorist groups’ survival. Theoretically, state failure favors resident terrorist groups’ survival, whilestate territorial control fosters resident groups’ termination until some control threshold. Empirically, weuncover a robust negative relationship between a country’s weakness and its control of terrorismthroughthelens of the resident terrorist groups’ survival prospects. The discovered relationship withstands a host of

robustness tests – e.g., alternative estimates and samples. We apply an instrument designed to addressendogeneity concerns. In particular, our novel instrument for failed states consists of the interaction betweennatural disasters and ethnic fractionalization. As a state’s percentage of territorial control increases, resident

terrorist groups are more prone to ending until some threshold control percent. Our analysis canguide《冲突解决杂志》（Journal of Conflict Resolution）是一份关于人类冲突的社会科学研究和理论的跨学科杂志。该杂志主要关注国际冲突，但也探讨了各种国家、群体间和人际冲突。该期刊 2022 年的影响因子为 3.1，在国际关系的96 种期刊中排名第 19。

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counterterrorism policy by exploiting the nuanced theoretical determinants identified here that foster resident

groups’ termination in failing states.

2. 不对称时代的核先发制人：博弈论方法（Deliberate Nuclear First Use in anEraof

Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach）

Even Hellan Larsen，奥胡斯大学政治学系博士研究员

【摘要】大多数核二元组都具有一定程度的核武器与常规武器不对称特征。本文认为，这些不对称创造了一种环境，在这种环境中，蓄意首先使用核武器 (DNFU) 可能是合理的。由于普遍依赖相互保证毁灭 (MAD) 的假设，这种可能性在核升级的正式文献中已被抛弃。本文建立了一个正式模型，用于追踪两种类型的 DNFU 如何以及在何种情况下是合理的。首先，核不平衡和反击技术的进步为强势参与者创造了限制损害的动机。其次，常规不对称为较弱的参与者强制使用核武器创造了动机。此外，本文还指出，这些不对称条件是重要且非常不同的核二元组的一个相关特征：朝鲜-美国、巴基斯坦-印度和俄罗斯-美国。因此，该模型展示了当今核格局中 DNFU 的潜在核心驱动因素。【原文】Most nuclear dyads are characterized by some degree of nuclear and conventional asymmetry. Thispaper argues that these asymmetries create an environment in which deliberate nuclear first use (DNFU) canbe rational. This possibility has been discarded in the formal literature on nuclear escalation because of thecommon reliance on the assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). This paper develops a formal

model that traces how and under what circumstances two types of DNFU are rational. First, nuclear

imbalances and advancements in counterforce technologies create a damage limitation incentive for a strongactor. Second, conventional asymmetry creates an incentive for the coercive use of nuclear weapons bytheweaker player. Moreover, this paper illustrates that these asymmetric conditions are a relevant characteristicin important and very different nuclear dyads: DPRK–US, Pakistan–India, and Russia–US. Thus, the model

demonstrates the potential core drivers of DNFU in today’s nuclear landscape.

3. 安全合作何时增加对外援助分配？（When Does Security Cooperation IncreaseForeign Aid Allocation?）

Qi Zhang，乔治城大学政治管理系博士候选人

【摘要】许多学者发现安全合作会增加盟国从大国获得的外援，但其他研究表明，联盟也存在负面影响，并且其条款会随着时间而变化。本文认为，捐助国的安全环境影响其参与安全合作，并在随后影响对盟国的外援分配。当安全环境具有竞争性时，捐助国将集中资源加强与盟国的联系。相反，当环境对捐助国有利时，捐助国可以利用安全合作作为筹码，从盟国获得政策让步，从而减少自身的外援支出。本文分析了三大捐助国的援助分配以及 72 个正式防务条约和 70 个双边防务合作协议，发现有利的安全环境可使捐助国对其盟国的经济贡献减少 19％。

【原文】While many scholars find that security cooperation increases the foreign aid that allies receive froma major power, other studies show that an alliance also has negative effect and its terms can change over

time. This article argues that a donor’s security environment impacts its participation in security cooperation

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and, subsequently, foreign aid allocation to allies. When the security environment is competitive, a donor

will concentrate its resources on strengthening its ties with allies. In contrast, when the environment isfavorable to a donor, it can use security cooperation as leverage to obtain policy concessions fromallies,

thus reducing its own foreign aid expenditures. This paper analyzes the aid allocation of three major power

donors as well as 72 formal defense pacts and 70 bilateral defense cooperation agreements, and it finds that afavorable security environment allows a donor to reduce its economic contribution to its allies by 19 percent.

4. 暴力与儿童教育：来自行政数据的证据（Violence and Children’s Education: EvidenceFrom Administrative Data）

Valentina Duque，美国大学公共事务与政策学院助理教授

【摘要】本文利用 1980 年代哥伦比亚暴力升级的现象，这种暴力升级与毒品集团的出现有关，并且使用行政数据以研究关于暴力事件对儿童的教育成就和学术成绩的影响。本文发现，早年童年时期较高的凶杀率与较高的辍学概率有关，而在完成高中教育的条件下，国家高中毕业考试的成绩较低。结果在几个伪造测试中均稳健，且对潜在的选择偏差来源进行了分析。作者提供了支持性证据，表明胎儿期、儿童期和青少年期的健康结果变化是重要的潜在机制。

【原文】This paper exploits the sharp escalation of violence in Colombia in the 1980s associated withtheemergence of drug cartels to provide novel evidence on the long-run effects of violence exposure throughout

the life-course, on children’s educational attainment and academic achievement using administrative data. I

find that, a higher homicide rate in early-childhood is associated with a higher probability of school dropout

and conditional on completing high school, lower scores on a national end-of-high school exam. Results arerobust to several falsification tests, and analyses of potential sources of selection bias. I provide supportiveevidence that changes in fetal, child, and adolescent health outcomes are important potential mechanisms.

5. 反叛、留守还是辞职？美国内战爆发时军事精英的决策（Rebel, Remain, or Resign?Military Elites’ Decision-Making at the Onset of the American Civil War）Peter B. White，奥本大学政治学系的助理教授

【摘要】内战的一个关键因素是军事分裂。然而，我们对军事精英为何参加内战以及为哪一方而战的理解有限。在本文中，作者提出了一种有关军事精英经济和职业动机的理论。作者以美国内战中西点军校毕业生为例来检验这一理论。作者认为，除了家乡之外，经济和职业利益也是西点军校毕业生的主要影响因素。与南方经济作物有联系的毕业生不太可能为联邦而战，而更有可能为邦联而战。排名较高的毕业生更有可能为双方而战，因为他们更有能力竞争晋升。作者用一个包含1000 多名西点军校毕业生战时效忠和内战前职业生涯的新数据集来检验这一论点，并找到了支持我预期的有力证据。【原文】A critical element in civil wars is military fragmentation. Yet, we have a limited understandingof

why military elites fight in civil wars and on what side. In this article I develop a theory of the economicandprofessional motivations of military elites. I test this theory using the case of West Point graduates intheAmerican Civil War. I argue that in addition to home state, economic and professional interests were a major

influence on West Pointers. Graduates with connections to Southern cash crops were less likely to fight for

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the Union and more likely to fight for the Confederacy. Higher ranking graduates were more likely tofight

for both sides, as they were better positioned to compete for promotion. I test this argument usinga newdataset of more than 1000 West Point graduates’ wartime allegiances and antebellum careers and findstrongevidence in support of my expectations.

6. 警察军事化是否会增加镇压？（Does Police Militarization Increase Repression?）Martin Stavro，坦帕大学政治学系本科生

Ryan M. Welch，坦帕大学政治学系助理教授。

【摘要】警察的军事化是否影响政府使用镇压手段？尽管比较研究检查了警察的军事化、暴力、人权侵犯和酷刑，但它并没有将军事化的警察纳入现有的镇压理论中。本文将警察军事化与镇压联系起来，认为警察军事化增加了警察对威胁的感知以及他们的强制能力，从而增加了他们镇压的意愿。因此，我们假设警察的军事化会增加镇压。为了评估这一理论，我们使用现有的涵盖1994 年到2010 年102个国家的数据集进行了一项国际分析。通过运用几种统计模型，数据支持了警察军事化增加了政府镇压的可能性的结论，特别是通过非法杀害和酷刑。除了强调警察军事化政策的一个后果外，这些发现还指出警察军事化是跨国模型中镇压和人权研究中一个重要的遗漏变量。【 原 文 】 Does police militarization influence government use of repression? While comparative workexamines police militarization, violence, human rights abuses, and torture, it does not integrate militarizedpolice within existing theories of repression. Connecting police militarization and repression, this articleargues that police militarization increases the police’s perception of threat as well as their coercive capacity,

thereby increasing their willingness to repress. As such, we hypothesize police militarization increasesrepression. To evaluate the theory, we conduct an international analysis using existing datasets covering102countries from 1994 to 2010. Employing several statistical models, the data supports the conclusionthat

police militarization increases the likelihood of government repression, specifically through extrajudicial

killing and torture. Aside from highlighting a consequence of police militarization policy, the findings point

to police militarization as an important omitted variable in cross-national models of repression and humanrights.

7. 秘密警察组织和国家镇压（Secret Police Organizations and State Repression）Marius Mehrl，利兹大学政治与国际研究学院讲师

Ioannis Choulis，埃塞克斯大学政府系博士候选人

【摘要】秘密警察通常被视为独裁者镇压机制中的关键机构。然而，我们缺乏关于秘密警察与镇压之间联系的明确实证证据。相反，最近的研究表明，秘密警察提供的监视减少了人身人权侵犯行为。本文重新审视了秘密警察与国家人身镇压之间的关系。我们确定了四种将这些变量联系起来的机制，即威慑、目标定位、组织实践和机构自我保护。这些机制对整体关系提供了截然不同的期望，但也对秘密警察何时可能（不）增加镇压提供了背景期望。为了检验这些期望，我们收集了有关秘密警察全球存在的数据。结果表明，秘密警察与人身镇压的增加有关，特别是当他们必须树立声誉以威慑异见人

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士或存在多个竞争安全组织时。相比之下，历史更悠久、更成熟的秘密警察或没有机构对手的秘密警察与人身镇压无关。

【原文】Secret police are generally viewed as key institutions in autocrats’ repression apparatus. However,

we lack clear empirical evidence on the link between secret police and repression. Instead, recent studiesindicate that the surveillance provided by secret police reduces physical human rights abuses. This paper

re-examines the relationship between secret police and physical state repression. We identifyfour

mechanisms linking these variables, deterrence, targeting, organizational practices, and institutional

self-preservation. These mechanisms provide contrasting expectations for the overall relationship but alsocontextual expectations on when secret police may (not) increase repression. To test these expectations, wecollect data on the global existence of secret police. Results indicate that secret police are associatedwithincreased physical repression, particularly when they must develop a reputation to deter dissidents or whenmultiple rival security organizations exist. In contrast, older, more established secret police or ones without

institutional rivals are not associated with physical repression.

8. 实现最低限度的威慑：战略核武器运载能力的新二元数据集（Achieving MinimumDeterrence: A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities）Kyungwon Suh，澳大利亚国立大学战略与国防研究中心讲师，加州大学全球冲突与合作研究所技术与国际安全博士后研究员

【摘要】本文认为，现有的定量研究错误地认为，所有核国家都可以通过简单地区分核国家和非核国家来对对手实施核毁灭。然而，这种做法并没有捕捉到 1) 核国家拥有的运载能力、2) 部署的核运载系统的范围以及 3) 核国家与其二元对应方（对手）之间的地理距离的变化。与这种单一的核国家方法不同，作者提出了二元核射程方法，该方法使用一种新的二元特定国家战略核运载能力测量方法。它使用有关每个核国家战略核运载平台、核作战基地和国家首都的估计射程的信息来编码核国家是否可以对特定对手发动核打击。实证应用表明，使用适当的核能力测量方法确实会显著改变现有的核武器和国际冲突的经验知识。

【原文】This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states canimpose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states fromnon-nuclear states.

This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states’ possession of delivery capabilities, 2)

the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states andtheir dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear

reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states’ strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It

codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the informationabout the estimated range of each nuclear state’s strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operationbases,

and states’ capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear

capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international

conflict.

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【编译：朱嘉成】【责任编辑：封欣怡】《世界政治》（World Politics）

World Politics，Vol.76, No.1, 2024

1. 移交权力以维持控制：权力下放作为西欧国家级选举策略（Transferring PowertoMaintain Control: Decentralization as a National-Level Electoral Strategy in WesternEurope）

Bonnie M. Meguid，美国罗切斯特大学政治学副教授

【摘要】为什么国家政府选择将一些行政、政治和财政权力移交给地方当局？本文提出并检验了一个以国家为中心的策略解释：权力下放是一种有针对性的手段，通过在国家议会选举中安抚具有威胁性的族群区域政党的选民，来增强执政党在国家一级的选举实力。对西欧国家次国家区域权力下放的统计分析证实，当政府在立法过程中处于脆弱状态时，执政党将额外的权力转移到存在族群区域政党威胁的地区。相反，如果一个政府不依赖于一个地区来维持对国家议会的控制，那么一个强大的族群区域对手的存在就不会促使政府去中心化。本文的发现有助于解释一个国家内部不同地区不对称的权力下放模式，以及为什么执政党将权力下放给不期望控制的次国家政府。

【原文】Why do national governments choose to transfer some of their administrative, political, andfiscal

powers to regional authorities? This article develops and tests a nationally focused strategic account:

decentralization is a targeted means to bolster a governing party's national-level electoral strengthbyappeasing the voters of threatening ethnoterritorial parties in national parliamentary elections. Statistical

analyses of decentralization across the subnational regions of Western European countries confirmthat

governing parties transfer additional competencies to regions in which an ethnoterritorial party threat exists,

when the government is legislatively vulnerable. In contrast, if a government is not dependent on a regionfor maintaining national parliamentary control, the presence of a strong ethnoterritorial opponent will not

motivate the government to decentralize. These findings help to explain patterns of asymmetrical

《世界政治》（World Politics）创刊于 1948 年，是享誉国际的政治科学季刊，内容涵盖国际关系和政治科学的各个领域，其主编是 Deborah J. Yashar。该期刊欢迎的投稿类型有具有理论和实证贡献的研究类文章，以及有关国际关系和 比 较 政 治 问 题 的 评 论 性 文 章 。 2020 年 期 刊 影 响 因 子为3.444，在 94 种国际关系类期刊中位列第 18 名，在182 种政治科学类期刊中位列第 44 名。

2024 年第4 期（总第16期）105

decentralization across regions within a country and why governing parties decentralize competencies tosubnational governments that they do not expect to control.

2. 不平衡的国家：塑造泰国国家能力的中心和边缘（The Uneven State: Center andPeriphery in Shaping State Capacity in Thailand）

Illan Nam，美国科尔盖特大学政治学副教授，兰伯特研究所所长

【摘要】本文考察了国家向边缘地区提供公共社会产品的不均衡能力。本文比较分析了泰国的公共卫生部和教育部，这两个机构在过去 25 年中在服务农村公民方面表现出明显差异。本文将这些结果归因于各机构如何看待其农村政策在应对泰国安全威胁和经济增长战略方面的重要性。这种看法在中央和地方官僚之间产生了截然不同的组织规范，激励了能力建设。当一个机构的中央办公室认为农村政策对国家目标至关重要时，就会制定规范，鼓励地方机构投资于满足农村需求。但是，当一个机构认为农村政策在实现关键的国家目标方面不那么紧迫时，情况就会相反。本文发现，一个机构在战略上考虑农村部门的方式会影响其在边缘地区投资的决策，对国家能力和城乡差距产生持久的影响。【原文】This article examines the state's uneven capacity to deliver public social goods to the periphery. It

does so through a comparative analysis of two agencies in Thailand, the Ministry of Public Health andtheMinistry of Education, which have exhibited a marked disparity in serving rural citizens over the past

twenty-five years. The author traces these outcomes to a divergence in how the agencies perceivethesignificance of their rural policies in meeting Thailand's security threats and economic growth strategy. Thisperception produces contrasting organizational norms between central and local bureaucrats, which informsincentives for capacity-building. When an agency's central office believes that rural policy matterssignificantly for national goals, norms develop that encourage local agents to invest in serving rural needs.

But when an agency deems rural policy to be less urgent in meeting key national objectives, the converseensues. The article finds that how an agency strategically considers the rural sector influences its decisions toinvest in the periphery, with lasting consequences for state capacity and the rural-urban divide.

3. 政府支出和投票行为（Government Spending and Voting Behavior）Anselm Hager，德国柏林洪堡大学社会科学学院助理教授

Hanno Hilbig，美国加州大学戴维斯分校政治科学系助理教授

【摘要】政府在公共产品上的支出会影响公民的投票选择吗？一方面，先前的研究将选民定性为财政保守派，当政府支出增加时，他们可能会转向保守派政党。另一方面，增加开支可能表明经济运行良好，这使得进步政党成为一个更可行的选择。为了在这两种假设之间做出判断，本文借鉴了一个自然实验，该实验产生了政府支出的外生变化。2011 年德国人口普查的中断意味着一些城市的预算出现了意想不到的增长。通过使用断点回归设计，本文表明预算的增加和随后的公共产品支出有利于左倾政党，但对现任支持者没有明显的影响。为了分解因果关系，本文依靠面板证据，证明接受实验的居民比没有接受实验的居民更看好他们的经济状况，这导致前者支持进步政党。

106

【原文】Does government spending on public goods affect the vote choice of citizens? On one hand, prior

research has characterized voters as fiscal conservatives who may turn toward conservative parties whengovernment spending goes up. On the other hand, increased spending may signal that the economy is doingwell, which makes progressive parties a more viable option. To adjudicate between both hypotheses, thisarticle draws on a natural experiment, which created exogenous variation in government spending. Adiscontinuity in the 2011 German census meant that some municipalities saw an unforeseen increaseinbudgets. Using a regression discontinuity design, the authors show that the increase in budgets andsubsequent spending on public goods benefited left-leaning parties but had no detectable effect on incumbent

support. To parse out the causal channel, the authors rely on panel evidence and demonstrate that treatedresidents viewed their economic situation more favorably than did untreated residents, which led the former

to espouse progressive parties.

4. 当民主带来不安全时：政权更迭的政治遗产（When Democracy Brings Insecurity:The Political Legacies of Regime Change）

Hans Lueders，美国斯坦福大学胡佛研究所胡佛研究员，瑞典哥德堡大学治理和地方发展研究所研究员，斯坦福大学移民政策实验室博士后

【摘要】一个国家民主化的环境可能对公民的政治态度产生持久的影响。为了阐述这一论点，本文将东德人对今天民主运作的满意度与他们在德国统一期间的经历联系起来：东德在经济极度不确定的条件下实现了民主化，这对经济评估如何与民主满意度联系起来产生了持久的影响。一项原创的调查实验发现，对当前经济不安全感的类似的经历对东德人的民主满意度的影响要强于西德人。家庭面板数据显示，这种影响在那些在转型期间经历了更多经济困难的东德人中更为明显。统一前对东德人的调查表明，在过渡之前，类似的模式并不存在。最后，跨国调查数据更广泛地证明了东欧人的类似模式。本文的发现通过强调权威主义崩溃的持久态度性影响，补充了现有的关于威权统治遗产的工作。【原文】The circumstances under which a country democratizes can have long-lasting consequences for

citizens' political attitudes. To develop this argument, the author links East Germans' satisfaction withthefunctioning of democracy today to their experiences during German reunification: East Germanydemocratized under conditions of extreme economic uncertainty, which has had enduring effects onhoweconomic evaluations are linked to democracy satisfaction. An original survey experiment finds that

qualitatively similar experiences of current economic insecurity have stronger effects on East thanWest

Germans' democracy satisfaction. Household panel data show that this effect is stronger among those East

Germans who experienced more economic hardship during the transition. Surveys of East Germans prior toreunification demonstrate that a similar pattern did not exist before the transition. Finally, cross-national

survey data document similar patterns among Eastern Europeans more broadly. These findings complement

existing work on the legacies of authoritarian rule by emphasizing the lasting attitudinal effects of

authoritarian breakdown.

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5. 制定原则：地方社会主义成就如何激发国家资产阶级对非缴费型养老金的支持（ Laying Down The Principles: How Local Socialist Achievements SpurredNational

Bourgeois Support for Noncontributory Pensions）

Magnus B. Rasmussen，挪威东南大学政治学副教授

Carl Henrik Knutsen，挪威奥斯陆大学政治学教授

【摘要】本文提出了一个地方嵌入福利国家发展的视角，以解释相对弱小的国家政治行为体如何通过追求地方改革逐步塑造国家政策。本文通过使用市级代表份额、非缴费养老金改革数据、议会唱名投票和 20 世纪初挪威的档案材料等实证材料来检验其论点。这些材料表明，在挪威采用国家计划之前，几个地方政府引入了非缴费养老金制度。本文首先展示了国家代表性不足但高度制度化的社会主义政党是如何在地理上集中支持的情况下引入地方养老金制度的。随着时间的推移，这些政党因此塑造了国家改革的可能性空间，有效地将国家政策议程锁定在社会主义者偏好的非缴费养老金制度当中。来自拥有地方养老金地区的资产阶级政客们以其选区的高额市政债务压力为理由，最终支持并推动了国家层面的养老金改革。这种支持反过来又刺激了建立国家非缴费养老金制度所需的跨阶层联盟。【原文】The authors develop a perspective of locally embedded welfare state development to explainhowrelatively weak national political actors can, nonetheless, shape national policy over time by pursuinglocal

reforms. Empirically, the authors assess their argument by using municipality-level representative shares,

data on noncontributory pension reforms, roll-call votes from parliament, and archival material fromearlytwentieth-century Norway, in which several local governments introduced noncontributory old-age pensionsbefore Norway adopted a national scheme. The authors show, first, how nationally underrepresentedbut

highly institutionalized socialist parties with geographically concentrated support introduced local pensions.

Over time, these parties thus shaped the possibility space for national reform, effectively locking the national

policy agenda into a pension system preferred by the socialists—namely, noncontributory pensions. Citinghigh municipality-debt pressures in their constituencies, bourgeois politicians from districts withlocal

pensions eventually supported and promoted national-level pension reform. This support, in turn, spurredthecross-class alliance required to establish a national noncontributory pension system.

【编译：林怡娉】【责任编辑：封欣怡】

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《国际关系》（International Relations）International Relations，Vol. 38, No. 2, 2024

1. 将国家利益与民粹主义机遇相结合：对欧洲极右翼的干预政治（Fitting national

interests with populist opportunities: intervention politics on the European radical right）Toby Greene，巴伊兰大学政治研究系讲师

【摘要】随着欧洲极右翼政党的影响力不断扩大，外交和安全政策也越来越政治化，这些政党越来越有可能影响各国关于国际事务的辩论。本文展示了极右翼反对党如何根据这些困境在特定国家环境中所带来的政治机遇的性质，寻求利用围绕军事干预的政策困境。研究结果基于对法国、德国和英国的叙利亚内战干预辩论中国民阵线、德国选择党和英国独立党所做反应的定性比较案例研究。本文发现，不干预并不是极右翼政党的绝对价值。虽然自由人道主义干预遭到一致反对，但以国家安全为由的干预，无论是打击“圣战”威胁还是防止失控的移民，都会引发一系列受国内政治背景影响的反应。然而，即使这些政党支持干预选举，他们的言论也侧重于将问题纳入其政治议程的民粹主义层面，尤其是攻击主流对手的无能、口是心非或前后矛盾，以及未能保护国家主权和民族完整。【原文】As European radical right parties grow in influence, and as foreign and security policy becomesmore politicised, these parties have increasing potential to shape national debates on international affairs.

This paper shows how radical right opposition parties seek to exploit policy dilemmas surrounding militaryintervention according to the nature of the political opportunity these dilemmas present in specific national

settings. Its findings are based on qualitative comparative case studies of Front National, AfD and UKIPresponses to intervention debates surrounding the Syrian civil war in France, Germany and the UK. I findthat non-intervention is not an absolute value for radical right parties. Whilst liberal-humanitarianinterventions are uniformly rejected, interventions on national security grounds, whether to combat Jihadist

threats or prevent uncontrolled migration, prompt a range of responses shaped by the domestic political

context. Yet even where these parties back intervention in votes, their discourse focuses on fitting the issueto the populist dimensions of their political agenda, especially attacking mainstream rivals for incompetence,

duplicity or incoherence, and failing to protect the sovereignty and ethnic integrity of the nation.

《国际关系》（International Relations）是国际关系领域的

顶尖期刊之一，由 SAGE 出版社与大卫·戴维斯纪念研究所

（ David Davies Memorial Institute ） 联 合 出 版 编 辑 ，

2021-2023 年影响因子为 1.6，SSCI 排名为 56/96。

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2. 欧盟对俄战略的战略文化与竞争愿景：灵活适应、合作威慑和精准对抗（Strategicculture and competing visions for the EU’s Russia strategy: flexible accommodation,

cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation）

Paul Silva II，宾夕法尼亚大学政治学博士

【摘要】本文分析了 2009 年至 2018 年期间欧盟成员国的国家安全战略，并提出了欧盟成员国对俄罗斯采取的三种安全战略——灵活适应、合作威慑和有针对性的对抗。本文将战略文化假设与现实主义和商业自由主义假设进行对比，以解释欧盟成员国对俄罗斯安全战略的变化。虽然现实主义的解释会预测地理位置上靠近俄罗斯的欧盟成员国将拥有更多的对抗性安全战略，但地理位置接近和对俄罗斯的对抗性安全战略并不呈正相关。与俄罗斯的双边经济相互依存关系、欧盟成员国执政联盟中民粹主义政党的存在以及欧盟成员国在冷战期间的结盟或被占领国家地位也无法解释欧盟成员国对俄罗斯的安全战略。欧盟成员国对俄政策的差异，一种更为一致的解释是围绕相关国家的战略文化。与更具欧洲主义观念的国家相比，更具大西洋主义观念的国家往往与俄罗斯发生更多对抗，无论它们与俄罗斯在地理上接近还是经济上相互依存。

【原文】This article analyzes the national security strategies of EU member states in the 2009–2018 period,

and conceptualizes three security strategies EU member states have adopted toward Russia – flexibleaccommodation, cooperative deterrence, and calibrated confrontation. It tests strategic culture hypothesesagainst those of realism and commercial liberalism to explain the variation of EU member states’ securitystrategies toward Russia. While a realist explanation would predict EU member states geographicallyproximate to Russia would possess more confrontational security strategies, geographic proximityandconfrontational security strategies toward Russia are not positively correlated. Bilateral economicinterdependence with Russia, the presence of populist parties in EU member states governing coalitions, andEU member states’ alignment or status as an occupied state during the Cold War also do not explainEUmember states’ security strategies toward Russia. A more consistent explanation of the variance inEUmember states’ policy on Russia revolves around the strategic culture of the state in question. States withamore Atlanticist perspective tend to be more confrontation with Russia than their more Europeanist

counterparts, regardless of geographic proximity or economic interdependence with Russia.

3. “反恐战争”全球化？对 36 个国家的分析（Globalising the ‘war on terror’?Ananalysis of 36 countries）

Tobias Ide，默多克大学政治与国际关系高级讲师

【摘要】反恐战争作为一种话语，认为恐怖主义是全球范围内的重大威胁，主要由伊斯兰网络所助长，需要国际社会作出强有力的回应。这种话语对国内和国际政治都产生了巨大影响。因此，大量研究分析了反恐战争话语所依据的假设和合法化政策。然而，现有的研究大多集中在一个或几个案例上，主要是在全球北部。本文介绍了一个新数据集，其中包含 2003 年至 2014 年期间36 个国家（占世界人口的约 64%）学校教科书中的反恐战争话语信息。基于此数据集，作者首次全面分析了反恐战争话语的全球传播。研究发现，反恐话语并没有全球化，而主要局限于欧洲和北美的发达国家。因此，美国

110

的软实力和恐怖主义话语的超全球化存在明显的局限性。恐怖主义强度、武装冲突和独裁政权等因素几乎没有预测能力。尽管受到挑战的（独裁）政权有明显的动机去适应反恐战争的话语，但情况仍然如此。与批判性安全和恐怖主义研究中的普遍假设相反，反恐战争话语几乎与强调恐怖分子的非理性和仇恨或社会政治不满的边缘化无关。

【原文】The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order.

Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, theanalysis of populism’s implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise reviewof the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the articleisdevoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzingthecomponents of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism,

intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others.

However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper alsoprovides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. Themain argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order

itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.

4. 选择性人道主义者：区域和冲突认知如何推动国内危机的军事干预（Selectivehumanitarians: how region and conflict perception drive military interventionsinintrastate crises）

Sidita Kushi，布里奇沃特州立大学政治学助理教授

【摘要】为什么一些国内暴力危机比其他危机更有可能引发人道主义军事干预？各国似乎对一些国内冲突（如科索沃）进行了强有力的干预，但在达尔富尔等更激烈的冲突中却没有采取类似的选择。关于这种“选择性差距”的研究大部分都集中在普遍规范或地缘政治利益上。然而，本文认为这些干预的选择性是区域差异与冲突认知相互作用的产物。本文介绍了 1989 年至 2014 年期间近1000 次国内武装冲突的观察结果，国际军事反应和其他方面反应，以及反映军事干预强度的干预指数。本文发现，一旦国内武装冲突达到了人类苦难的临界点，强国就会进行干预，这取决于冲突是否发生在西方势力范围内，以及是否被称为身份认同战争。西方国家没有基于身份的内战认知，因此最有可能引发人道主义军事干预。这些结论对于国际政治中规范和利益所起的作用（受地区影响）以及军事干预作为一种政策选择具有重要意义。

【原文】Why are some violent intrastate crises more likely to prompt humanitarian military interventionsthan others? States appear to intervene robustly in reaction to some internal conflicts, such as Kosovo, but

withhold similar options in more intense conflict, as in Darfur. Much of the research on this ‘selectivitygap’

focuses on universal norms or geopolitical interests. I, however, argue that the selectivity of theseinterventions is a product of regional variations interacting with conflict perceptions. This paper introducesadataset of almost 1000 observations of intrastate armed conflict between 1989 and 2014, pairedwithinternational military responses and non-responses, as well as an Intervention Index that accounts for theintensity of military interventions. I find that once a threshold of human suffering is met via the existenceof

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an internal armed conflict, powerful states will intervene depending on whether the conflict occurs intheWestern sphere of influence and whether it is denoted as an identity war. A Western region coupled withnoperceptions of identity-based civil war prompts the greatest odds of humanitarian military intervention. Suchconclusions carry implications on the role of norms and interests in international politics, as biased byregion,

and for military intervention as a policy choice.

5. 处理国际政治中的内疚和耻辱（Dealing with guilt and shame in international politics）Lotem Bassan-Nygate，威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校政治学博士

Gadi Heimann，耶路撒冷希伯来大学国际关系教授

【摘要】国家和非国家行为者经常试图激起罪恶感和羞耻感等道德情感，以动员政治变革。然而，“点名羞辱”等策略往往效果不佳，这表明决策者介入违反规范时会采取尽量减少使用道德情感的方式。作者认为，在违反规范时，决策者通过应对机制来处理罪恶感和羞耻感，这些机制使他们能够推行与其道德标准相悖的政策。本文将罪恶感和羞耻感概念化为两种不同的现象，它们会引发不同的反应。羞耻感更有可能引发否认和歪曲等不成熟的防御，而罪恶感则会激起更成熟的补偿性反应。通过研究以色列建国后第一个十年政治议程上的两个关键问题，为这一理论提供了实证证据。本文使用来自三个不同政治论坛的一系列主要资料，分析了关于巴勒斯坦难民返回和以色列与西德赔偿协议的政治辩论。

【原文】State and non-state actors often try to provoke moral emotions like guilt and shame to mobilizepolitical change. However, tactics such as `naming and shaming’ are often ineffective, suggesting that policymakers engage in norm violations in ways that minimize moral emotions. We argue that when violatingnorms, decision makers deal with guilt and shame through coping mechanisms that allowthemto pursuepolicies that contradict their moral standards. We conceptualize guilt and shame as two separate phenomenathat provoke distinct reactions. Shame is more likely to provoke immature defenses like denial and distortion,

while guilt provokes a more mature and reparative reaction. We provide empirical evidence for this theoryby examining two crucial issues on the state of Israel’s political agenda during the first decade of itsexistence. We analyze political debates over the return of the Palestinian refugees and the reparationagreement between Israel and West Germany, using a series of primary sources from three different political

forums.

【编译：邹梓轩】【责任编辑：封欣怡】

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《国际评论研究》（Review of International Studies）Review of International Studies， Vol. 50, No. 3, 2024

1. 展望：国际关系学的未来（On the horizon: The futures of IR）Martin Coward，英国伦敦玛丽女王大学政治与国际关系学院教授、院长

Matthew Paterson，曼彻斯特大学国际政治学教授、主任

Richard Devetak，昆士兰大学政治学与国际研究学院教授

Carolina Moulin，巴西米纳斯联邦大学经济科学系

Nisha Shah，渥太华大学政治研究系副教授

Maja Zehfuss，哥本哈根大学政治学系教授

Andreja Zevnik，曼彻斯特大学国际政治系讲师

【摘要】本期特刊旨在纪念《国际研究评论》创刊 50 周年。自 1975 年以来，《国际研究评论》已出版了 200 多期，发表了 1300 多篇文章，并且在塑造国际关系（IR）学科方面发挥了关键作用，引领或批判性地介入了许多重要辩论。为纪念创刊 50 周年，本期特刊将探讨在未来50 年全球政治或将面临的挑战。不同于国际关系学常将目光转向历史根源，此次我们着眼于未来。在本导言中，我们首先概述了着眼未来的四种思维传统：实证主义、现实主义预测；规划、预测和情景构建；对理想政治未来的乌托邦式梦想；以及积极政治中的前瞻性思维。从这些传统中，我们了解到对未来的思考始终是对现在的反思。然后，我们在特刊文章中概述了四个主题：我们如何思考未来？如何思考帝国的过去以及当前持续存在的殖民化和种族化问题？技术变革将如何调解和产生地缘政治变革？社会生态危机，尤其是气候变化，如何日益影响我们对全球政治未来的思考？总之，本次特刊提供了一组关于全球政治未来的多样化、激励性和发人深省的文章，既包括学科讨论，也包括实证问题。【原文】This Special Issue celebrates the 50th anniversary of Review of International Studies. Since 1975,

the Review has published over 200 issues and over 1300 articles. The journal has played a key role inshaping the discipline of International Relations (IR), leading, or critically intervening in, key debates. Tocelebrate 50 years of Review of International Studies, we have curated a Special Issue examining thechallenges facing global politics for the next 50 years. IR has regularly turned its attention backwards《国际 研究评论》 （Review of International Studies）是由剑桥大学出版社代表英国国际研究协会出版且同行评审的国际关系学术期刊，其前身为 British Journal of International

Studies (1975 - 1980)。该期刊致力于反映全球政治的性质变化和新兴的政治挑战，旨在为国际社会搭建一个可供辩论的平台用以讨论当下紧迫的全球议题。过去五年综合影响因子为 3。

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towards its historical origins. Instead, we look to the future. In this Introduction, we start by outliningfour

traditions of future-oriented thinking: positivist, realist prediction; planning, forecasting, andscenario-building; utopian dreams of an ideal political future; and prefigurative thinking in activist politics.

From these traditions, we learn that thinking about the future is always thinking about the present. We thenoutline four themes in the Special Issue articles: How do we think about the future at all? Howdo we thinkabout imperial pasts and the ongoing questions of colonization and racialization in the present? Howwill

technological change mediate and generates geopolitical change? How are socioecological crises, andinparticular climate change, increasingly shaping how we think about the future of global politics? Overall,

these provide us with a diverse, stimulating, and thought-provoking set of essays about the future of global

politics, as both discipline and set of empirical problems.

2. 未来只是另一个过去（The future is just another past）Oliver Kessler，埃尔福特大学国际关系教授

Halvard Leira，挪威国际事务研究所教授

【摘要】在面对未来前，国际研究需先深入了解自身的过去与现在。这一领域不仅在名称上缺乏共识，更重要的是描述现象的关键概念在不断变化：19 世纪（以来）产生的概念都有过改变，也没有过去所设想的未来能真正预见当下。旧概念被抛弃，新概念被采用，现有概念被修改。这意味着任何“未来学”研究都必须对概念变革保持开放态度，国际研究今后将面临的主要挑战之一是确保我们的概念工具箱与日新月异的世界保持一致。然而，直到最近，全球政治研究对概念变革的重要性都未给予足够重视。因此，本文首先通过阐明国际领域过去与现在的主要概念变化，为纳入概念变革提供了实证案例。接着，本文介绍了概念史及其为我们提供的分析工具，以更好理解概念变革，最后讨论在思考全球政治的未来时如何应对概念的发展。

【原文】Before International Studies can confront the future, it needs to get a better grip on its past andpresent. The discipline lacks agreement on both its own name and the name of its object of study. Moreimportantly, key concepts used to describe phenomena have changed continuously: no concept emerginginthe 19th century has remained untouched, no envisioned future of the past could have prepared us for thepresent. Old concepts have been discarded, new ones adopted, and existing ones modified. This implies that

any exercise in ‘futurology’ must necessarily come with an openness towards conceptual change, andthat akey challenge for International Studies going forward will consist in matching our conceptual toolboxtoanever-changing world. The importance of conceptual change has until recently been neglected in the studyof

global politics. Thus, in this paper we start by presenting the empirical case for incorporating conceptual

change by laying out key past and present conceptual changes in the international realm. We then moveonto a presentation of conceptual history and the tools it provides us for grasping conceptual change, beforediscussing how to tackle conceptual developments when thinking about the future of global politics.

3. 在“自我解体”中走向成熟（Coming of age within ‘implosion’）

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Luise Bendfeldt，乌普萨拉大学政府学系博士生

Emily Clifford，英国伦敦大学皇家霍洛威学院讲师

Hannah Richards，卡迪夫大学政治与国际关系博士生

【摘要】在最近一篇文章中，玛丽亚·埃里克森·巴兹与斯瓦蒂·帕拉夏探讨了欧洲中心主义在批判性国际关系学中依然盛行的现象，揭示了“操控者视点”（master’s outlook）如何继续阻碍全球政治的研究，最终助长了学科的紊乱甚至自我解体。本文基于对批判性国际关系学“自我解体”的设想，反思了本文作者——两名全球政治学博士生和一名早期职业研究者对未来教学的期望。本文首先审视了作者自身在再现这门学科的西方中心主义时的共谋行为，并探讨如何有效地利用这种不适感。进而考察了课堂激进性的潜力，以及共情与合作探究对全球政治学未来的必要性。本文倡导一种具有想象力、关联性、复杂性和脆弱性的国际关系学，并对其如何实现有意义且可持续的“自我解体”充满希望。我们接受不适与失败的可能性，希望以新兴女权主义学者和充满希望的青年教师的视角，为识别学术界不断的“紊乱”做出贡献。

【 原 文 】 In a recent article, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Swati Parashar1 trace the continued salienceof

Eurocentrism in critical International Relations (IR), demonstrating how the ‘master’s outlook’ continues tostifle the study of global politics; they ultimately encourage an unsettling and even implosion of thediscipline. Starting from this proposed ‘implosion’ of critical IR, this article reflects on our hopes, as twocurrent PhD candidates and one early career researcher in global politics, for teaching and learninginthisfuture world. We begin by reflecting on our own complicity in reproducing the Western-centrismof thediscipline and consider how this discomfort can be used productively. The article then considers the radical

potential of the classroom and the necessity of empathetic, collaborative inquiry to the future of thediscipline of global politics. We advocate for an IR which is imaginative, relational, messy, and vulnerable–and are hopeful about how this may animate a meaningful and sustainable implosion. Embracingour

discomfort and the possibility of failure, we hope to contribute to the ongoing ‘unsettling’ of academia fromthe standpoint of incipient feminist scholars and hopeful early-career teachers.

4. 国际政治中的种族和系统性危机：多元学术议程（Race and systemic crisesininternational politics: An agenda for pluralistic scholarship）Andrew S. Rosenberg，佛罗里达大学政治学助理教授

【摘要】近年来，全球政治学者表明，种族和白人至上问题在国际历史、国际关系领域的形成以及当代理论中都占据核心位置。本文认为，种族问题同样在 21 世纪当前和未来的系统性危机中扮演关键角色：这些危机包括愈发严重的气候变化、日益加深的不平等、资本主义的固有不稳定性以及移民问题。为支撑这一观点，本文描述了当前危机的轮廓，并揭示了种族主义如何加剧其影响。简而言之，资本主义的赢家和输家以及气候变化的影响都沿着种族界限划分，进一步加剧对全球南部非白人移民与国家的直接和间接种族歧视。这些相互关联的危机会深刻影响未来 50 年的国际政治，并可能永久固化全球种族不平等的恶性循环。因此，本文提出了一项研究议程，号召所有国际关系学者探讨种族在国际体系中的实证影响，将全球政治中被边缘化的历史与当代视角纳入研究，并解决21 世纪最紧迫的政治问题。

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【原文】In recent years, scholars of global politics have shown that issues of race and white supremacylieat

the centre of international history, the birth of the field of International Relations, and contemporary theory.

In this article, I argue that race plays an equally central role in the 21st century’s current and future crises:

the set of systemic risks that includes intensifying climate change, deepening inequality, the endemicinstabilities of capitalism, and migration. To make this argument, I describe the contours of the current crisisand show how racism amplifies its effects. In short, capitalism’s winners and losers and the effects of

climate change fall along racial lines, amplifying both direct and indirect racial discrimination against

non-white migrants and states in the Global South. These interdependent crises will shape the next 50yearsof international politics and will likely perpetuate the vicious cycle of global racial inequality. Accordingly,

this article presents a research agenda for all IR scholars to explore the empirical implications of race intheinternational system, integrate marginalised perspectives on global politics from the past and present intotheir scholarship, and address the most pressing political issues of the 21st century.

5. 侨民地缘政治、崛起的大国和国际秩序的未来（Diasporic geopolitics, risingpowers,

and the future of international order）

Fiona B. Adamson，伦敦大学亚非学院教授

Enze Han，香港大学政治与公共行政学系副教授

【摘要】本文将“侨民地缘政治”（diasporic geopolitics）视为未来全球政治的重要因素。国际关系领域关于全球秩序的讨论往往高度空间化，本文则强调世界各个地区通世界上哪些不同的地区通过正在进行的移民过程而纠缠在一起，及其以全球侨民的形式留下的遗产。本文通过聚焦崛起中的大国及其与现有国际秩序的关系，探讨这些联系的重要性。中国、印度和土耳其等主要移民输出国如今都在国际事务中寻求施加全球影响力。在此背景下，这些国家的侨民治理政策也发生了转变，侨民正被视为推进输出国地缘政治议程和大国雄心的重要资产。本文考察了这些国家通过其侨民参与政策在跨国上施加权力的三种机制。国家可以将其侨民视为促进贸易与外资的经济资产；作为有助于推广“文明”政治的软实力资产；以及作为可以战略性动员或抑制的外交资产。最后，本文讨论了这些机制对于未来 50 年全球秩序与强权政治性质的启示。

【原文】This article examines ‘diasporic geopolitics’ as a significant factor in the future of global politics.

Whereas discussions of global order in IR have been highly spatialised, we instead highlight the extent towhich different regions of the world are entangled via ongoing migration processes, and their legacies intheform of global diasporas. We examine the significance of these interconnections by focusing onrisingpowers and their relations with the existing international order. Major migration-sending states suchasChina, India, and Turkey are now aspiring great powers that seek to exert global influence in international

affairs. In this context, their diaspora governance policies are also undergoing a transformation, withdiasporas increasingly understood as important assets for promoting sending states’ geopolitical agendas andgreat power ambitions. We examine three mechanisms by which such states exert power transnationallyviatheir diaspora engagement policies. States can treat ‘their’ diasporas as economic assets that facilitate tradeand foreign investment; as soft power assets that contribute to the promotion of ‘civilisational’ politics; and

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as diplomatic assets that can be strategically mobilised or repressed. We conclude by discussingtheimplications for thinking about the nature of global order and power politics in the coming 50 years.

6. 国际关系中的后社会主义：方法与批判（Postsocialism in International Relations:Method and critique）

Claudia Aradau，伦敦国王学院国际政治系教授

【摘要】尽管国际关系的后殖民主义视角为全球政治提供了新的概念、方法和政治想象，但后社会主义（postsocialism）作为一种分析和政治方法却一直缺席。后社会主义主要是一个描述性术语，指第二世界向自由民主和市场经济的时间过渡，或指东欧和前苏联的地缘政治空间。本文借鉴在分析与政治角度上将后社会主义和后殖民主义相结合的文献，尤其是女权主义研究，通过重新诠释后社会主义来理解当代社会主义的全球遗产。本文建议将后社会主义的维度作为方法和批判进行剖析。在方法维度上，后社会主义关注社会主义遗产在当下如何延续和转变，同时包容矛盾与不确定性。在批判维度上，后社会主义是面向横向团结（transversal solidarities）和可以支撑这些斗争的认识词汇的。本文将这些方法与批判的维度置于边界和移民的相关辩论中进行实证分析。后社会主义并非旨在取代其他批判方法，而是为了丰富我们的词汇并增加政治干预。

【原文】While postcolonial approaches to International Relations have offered new concepts, methods, andpolitical imaginaries of global politics, postsocialism has been absent as an analytical and political approach.

Postsocialism has been mainly a descriptive term naming the temporal transition of the Second Worldtoliberal democracy and market economy or the geopolitical space of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet

Union. Building on literature that has connected postsocialism and postcolonialismanalyticallyandpolitically, particularly feminist work that has reclaimed postsocialism to understand the global legacies of

socialism in the present, this article proposes to unpack dimensions of postsocialism as method and critique.

Postsocialism as method attends to how socialist legacies endure and are transformed in the present whileholding together contradictions and ambivalences. Postsocialism as critique is oriented to transversal

solidarities and the epistemic vocabularies that can undergird these struggles. To trace these dimensions of

method and critique, the article is situated empirically within debates about borders and migration.

Postsocialism is not intended to replace or displace other critical approaches but to pluralise our vocabulariesand multiply political interventions.

7. 从底层重构社会生态生活：走向全球多数人的地球政治经济学（Reproducingsocio-ecological life from below: Towards a planetary political economy of the global

majority）

Cemal Burak Tansel，纽卡斯尔大学地理、政治和社会学学院国际政治经济和全球发展政治学高级讲师Lisa Tilley，伦敦大学亚非学院发展研究系高级讲师

【摘要】面对未来 50 年的危机——套用安东尼奥·葛兰西（Antonio Gramsci）的名言——既需要批判性的悲观主义，也需要一种任性的希望政治。本文以必要的批判性悲观主义探讨气候危机的政治问题，

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并应对更广泛的社会生态危机。具体来说，我们面临着金融资本对绿色转型的迫切需求，以及围绕电气化消费社会的愿景建立新的积累结构的令人不安的转型方向。未来几十年，全球资产阶级的财富将继续增长，以及快速侵占大气公域。面对这种财富集中的反乌托邦图景、企业过剩和土地危机，本文关注全球各地顽强重构社会生态生活的实际项目，并与那些通过城市共建、粮食主权、原住民组织和照护经济来自下往上再现生活的社区合作。这些社区都在通过另类国际组织扩大其愿景。本文认为，这些项目展示了一种全球化的多层次政治经济学，将具体经验与对抗国家、企业和跨国资本主义的力量相结合。鉴于这些社区的经验教训，本文呼吁建立“全球多数人的地球政治经济学”，优先考虑立足现实的反系统项目的社会生态生活再生产愿景。

【 原 文 】 Confronting the coming five decades from our present conjuncture demands – to paraphraseAntonio Gramsci’s famous mantra – both critical pessimism and a wilful politics of hope. In this article, weengage with the politics of climate breakdown and the responses to wider socio-ecological crises withanecessary critical pessimism. Specifically, we confront the capture of green transition imperatives by financecapital, as well as the troubling orientation of transition towards building new structures of accumulationaround the vision of an electrified consumer society. We also see the coming decades being markedbytheever-increasing wealth of global asset-owning classes – who, by definition, enclose the atmosphericcommons faster than any other community. Against this dystopian picture of increasingly concentratedwealth, corporate excess, and terrestrial crisis, we focus on the stubborn reproduction of socio-ecological lifethrough various grounded projects across the world. We engage with communities who work against

structural constraints to reproduce life from below through urban commoning, food sovereignty, Indigenousorganising, and caretaking economies – all of which are scaling out their visions through alternativeinternationals. All of these projects, we argue, present a planetary and multiscalar political economyinpractice, which connects grounded experience with resistance to the dynamics of capitalismat the state,

corporate, and transnational levels. With lessons from these communities in mind, we call for a ‘planetarypolitical economy of the global majority’, which prioritises the reproduction of socio-ecological lifeaccording to the visions of grounded anti-systemic projects.

8. 人工智能与国际关系的未来：厘清世界政治中有血有肉的、制度性的和人工合成的道德能动性（AI and the future of IR: Disentangling flesh-and-blood, institutional, andsynthetic moral agency in world politics）

Toni Erskine，澳洲国立大学珊瑚钟亚太事务研究院，国际政治学主任兼教授。【摘要】智能机器——从自动化机器人到算法系统——可以创造图像和诗歌、引导我们的偏好、辅助决策甚至杀人。我们对其能力、相对自主性和道德地位的看法，不仅将深刻影响我们如何解释和解决未来 50 年世界政治中的实际问题，还将影响我们如何制定和评估个人和国家的应对措施。本文主张必须对这一新兴的合成代理展开分析，以便有效引导并对世界政治的未来进行理论化。首先，本文概述了国际关系学科如何对“能动性”理论化不足，并指出人工智能颠覆了现有观念。其次，本文考察了人类个体和正式组织（国际关系已熟悉的有目的的行为体）如何具备作为道德行为体或义务承担者的资格，并探讨智能机器需要满足哪些标准才能具备该资格。在证明了合成智能体目前缺乏道德能动

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性所需的“反思自主性”之后，本文转向战争背景，说明从这种比较分析中得出的见解如何反驳我们倾向于淡化道德行为体的不同表现方式的做法，这种做法侵蚀了世界政治中关键的责任观念。【原文】Intelligent machines – from automated robots to algorithmic systems – can create images andpoetry,

steer our preferences, aid decision making, and kill. Our perception of their capacities, relative autonomy,

and moral status will profoundly affect not only how we interpret and address practical problems inworldpolitics over the next 50 years but also how we prescribe and evaluate individual and state responses. Inthisarticle, I argue that we must analyse this emerging synthetic agency in order to effectively navigate –andtheorise – the future of world politics. I begin by outlining the ways that agency has been under-theorisedwithin the discipline of International Relations (IR) and suggest that artificial intelligence (AI) disruptsprevailing conceptions. I then examine how individual human beings and formal organisations – purposiveactors with which IR is already familiar – qualify as moral agents, or bearers of duties, and explore what

criteria intelligent machines would need to meet to also qualify. After demonstrating that synthetic agentscurrently lack the ‘reflexive autonomy’ required for moral agency, I turn to the context of war to illustratehow insights drawn from this comparative analysis counter our tendency to elide different manifestations of

moral agency in ways that erode crucial notions of responsibility in world politics.

9. 控制的未来/未来的控制：2074 年全球（失序）秩序与无处不在的武器化（The futureof control/The control of the future: Global (dis)order and the weaponisationofeverywhere in 2074）

Mark Lacy，兰卡斯特大学政治与国际关系高级讲师

【摘要】本文提出，未来 50 年人类面临的主要挑战将围绕社会与政治控制问题。这是现代性政治与社会问题的延续，并将在多样的政治背景和各种技术“工具”下展开。安全技术专家将尝试管理由“万物武器化”和“无处不在的武器化”（借用马克·加莱奥蒂的用语）所导致的混乱与不安状态，届时各国将努力控制新兴领域与地域。然而，到 2074 年，各社会可能面临现代政治问题日益加剧的局面，气候紧急情况和其他生态/技术危险的影响可能导致全球性混乱，其程度将远超现代性时期的经验，根本性改变（或破坏）国际政治的“物质”基础，呈现出前所未有的问题。在这个节点上，正如布鲁诺·拉图尔所言，为了我们自身与他人的生存，可能不得不抛弃从现代性“继承”下来的政治与经济观念。【 原 文 】 In this article, I am going to suggest that questions of societal and political control will befundamental to the challenges humanity faces in the next 50 years, a continuation of the political andsocial

problems of modernity but playing out in a range of political contexts and with a range of technological ‘tools’. Technicians of security will attempt to manage the disorder and insecurity that results fromthepotential weaponisation of everything, to use a phrase from Mark Galeotti, and the weaponisationof

everywhere, a condition where the state will be seeking to control a range of emerging terrains and domains.

But at the same time, while societies in 2074 might be confronting conditions that are an intensificationof

modern political problems, there is the possibility that the impact of climate emergencies andother

ecological/technological dangers might produce global disorder unlike anything experienced in modernity,

radically transforming (or mutilating) the ‘material’ foundations of international politics, presenting us with

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problems unlike anything encountered before. At this point, as Bruno Latour suggested, we might havetodepart (for our own survival and the survival of others) from the ideas about politics and economy that wehave ‘inherited’ from modernity.

10. 与自然和平共处：生态外交的愿景与挑战（On making peace with nature: Visions andchallenges towards an ecological diplomacy）

Costas M. Constantinou，塞浦路斯大学国际关系学教授

Eleni Christodoulou, 塞浦路斯大学

【摘要】联合国呼吁“与自然和平相处”应成为 21 世纪的关键使命，本文对此进行了探讨。文章研究了为了实现这种和解生态所设想的外交模式。它借鉴了联合国系统中最有前景却鲜为人知的项目之一——“与自然和谐相处”（HwN）计划。该计划率先倡导以地球为基础的法理学与自然权利概念，并对这种外交转变进行了理论化，评估了 21 世纪生态外交在政府间议程之外如何高效运行。基于土著思想和万物有灵论的认识论，HwN 等项目提倡与地球建立一种新的关系，并使探索“自然”作为外交对话者成为可能。本文认为，现有的和平建设范式未能充分捕捉人与自然关系中的外交层面与复杂的地方动态，建议基于生态外交进行重新构思，这种外交既具有扩张性又具变革性，并将这种关系视为一种困难的共存关系。

【原文】This article interrogates United Nations (UN) calls that ‘making peace with nature’ should becomethe crucial mission of the 21st century. It ponders the kind of diplomacy envisioned for such a reconciliationecology to be credible. Drawing on one of the most promising and less known programmes of theUNsystem – namely, Harmony with Nature (HwN), which pioneers Earth-based jurisprudence and rights of

nature – it conceptualises this diplomatic shift and assesses the conditions under which ecological diplomacycan be productively operationalised in the 21st century vis-à-vis a mere rhetorical appropriationandco-optation by intergovernmental agendas. Building on Indigenous thought and animist epistemologies,

programmes such as HwN espouse a new relationship with Planet Earth and make it possible to explore‘nature’ as diplomatic interlocutor. We argue that existing paradigms of peacebuilding fail to sufficientlycapture the diplomatic aspects and complex local dynamics of the human–nature relationship and suggest areconceptualisation based on an ecological diplomacy that is both expansive and transformative andviewsthis relationship as one of troubled coexistence.

11. 地球陷阱：地球以外的国际关系（The terrestrial trap: International Relations beyondEarth）

Enrike van Wingerden，鹿特丹伊拉斯姆斯大学的研究员和讲师

Darshan Vigneswaran，阿姆斯特丹大学政治学系副教授

【摘要】未来 50 年，人类探索和塑造外太空的能力将显著提升。然而，国际关系理论仍然将外太空视为一个孤立、独特或无足轻重的政治领域。本文通过理论化行星政治（planetary politics），将国际关系从其“地球陷阱”中解放出来，使其与地球之外的环境与行为者建立内在联系。面对从太空军事化

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到太空殖民化的深刻且令人不安的政治变革，本文对国际关系理论的两个地球偏见提出挑战。首先，质疑国际关系的发展只发生在地球上或主要发生在地球上的假设。本文展示了历史上形成的殖民与统治的意识形态和政治经济如何延伸到太空探索与定居，同时也在其中发生转变。其次，质疑外层空间的发展是地球上政治逻辑的直接延伸。本文超越人类栖息区，探索太空的物质条件如何与政治治理与控制的特定历史相互交织。通过分析地球之外的政治，本文重新调整了国际关系理论来应对未来的太空政治。

【原文】Human capacity to explore and shape outer space will increase substantially over the next 50years.

Yet, International Relations (IR) theory still treats outer space as an isolated, unique, or inconsequential

realm of political life. This paper moves IR beyond its ‘terrestrial trap’ by theorising planetary politics asinherently embedded in relations with environments and actors that are located beyond Earth. To facethemomentous and often alarming political developments taking place in outer space, fromspace militarisationto space colonisation, we challenge two of IR’s terrestrial biases. First, we confront the assumptionthat

developments in international relations take place only or primarily on Earth. We show howthe historicallyconstituted ideologies and political economies of colonisation and domination are extended to – but alsotransformed within – outer space exploration and settlement. Second, we challenge the notionthat

developments in outer space form a logical extension of politics as it has emerged on the habitable surfaceof

our planet. We move beyond zones of human habitation and explore how the material conditions of spaceintersect with situated histories of political governance and control. By analysing politics beyond Earth, weretool IR theory to confront an extraterrestrial political future.

【编译：杨鲁华】【责任编辑：封欣怡】

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《中国国际政治季刊》（The China Journal of International Politics）The China Journal of International Politics，Vol. 17, No. 2, 2024

1. 国际关系理论中的中国学派：被忽视的过程、有争议的进展和不确定的前景（TheChinese School of IR Theory: Ignored Process, Controversial Progress, andUncertainProspects）

鲁鹏，华东政法大学政府管理学院教授

【摘要】本文综述了国际关系理论中中国学派的相关议题。经过 20 多年的不懈努力，中国学派取得了具体的突破，如关系理论、道义现实主义和共生理论的出现。中国学派由此进入了一个新的阶段，其主要任务已从理论创新升级为理论发展。但要进一步发展，中国学派需要西方同行的批判性回应。然而更多由于语言障碍、中国国际关系中非对抗性的学术传统，以及双方存在的民族中心主义，中国学派和西方理论之间为数不多的对话往往存在问题，重要议题要么被忽视，要么被歪曲。为了进一步研究中国学派与西方理论之间全面而深入的思想交流，本文将中国学派的相关议题分为三个方面：演进过程；理论研究进展；以及中国学派与其他理论（特别是全球国际关系）的未来关系。本文主要依靠对中国学派出版物的话语分析，旨在为西方理论与中国学派之间的进一步交流奠定基础。【原文】This article reviews issues relevant to the Chinese School of International Relations (IR) theory.

After 20 or more years of relentless effort, the Chinese School has achieved concrete breakthroughs, evident

in the emergence of Relational Theory, Moral Realism, and Symbiosis Theory. The Chinese School has thusentered a new stage, its primary task having been upgraded from theory innovation to theory development.

But to proceed further, the Chinese School needs critical responses from its Western counterparts. Owingprimarily to the language barrier, as well as to the non-confrontational academic tradition within ChineseIR,

and the ethnocentrism that both sides practice, the few dialogues that have taken place between the ChineseSchool and Western theories have tended to be problematic, with important issues either ignoredor

misrepresented. In order to further study a comprehensive and intensive exchange of ideas betweenthe《中国国际政治季刊》（The China Journal of International

Politics） 创刊于 2006 年，2012 年进入 SSCI，迄今仍是中国大陆主办的唯一一份政治学 SSCI 专业期刊。自创刊以来，CJIP 坚持发表原创性学术研究成果，重点推动国际关系理论创新和中国对外关系方面的研究，发表了诸多国内外知名学者的文章。CJIP 发表的文章在东亚、欧洲和北美三地学者间保持了较好的平衡，在促进国际关系理论多元化发展方面发挥了独特作用。2022 年该刊影响因子为 2.0，在96 份国际关系类 SSCI 期刊中名列第 39，是亚洲地区排名最高的国际关系类 SSCI 期刊。

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Chinese School and Western theories, this article categorises issues relevant to the Chinese School intothreeareas. They are: process of evolution; progress in theoretical studies; and the Chinese School’s futurerelationship with other theoretical entities (in particular, Global IR). Predominantly reliant uponthediscourse analysis of Chinese School publications, this contribution seeks to provide a foundation for further

exchanges between Western theories and the Chinese School.

2. “西方”与中国国际关系理论中的国家主义伦理形象：界定（并解读）清华路径的“道义现实主义”（Images of a Statist Ethic in “Western” and Chinese IRTheory:

Locating (and Deciphering) the “Moral Realism” of the Tsinghua Approach）Toni Erskine，澳大利亚国立大学珊瑚贝尔亚太事务学院国际政治学教授

Liane Hartnett，墨尔本大学政治与社会科学学院国际关系讲师

【摘要】本文确定并质疑了一条错综复杂地交织在古典现实主义、国际关系（IR）规范理论以及张锋（2012）所称的中国国际关系的“清华路径”中的线索。这条线索是一个饱含争议的概念，即国际政治的国家主义伦理，或者是一种赋予国家、同胞和国家利益优先权的伦理观点。这些理论传统中的立场，包括我们所说的古典现实主义传统中的“利己主义现实主义”和“负责任的现实主义”，国际关系规范理论中的“社群主义现实主义”和“公正主义国家主义”，以及其他人所描述的清华路径中的“道义现实主义”——都致力于一种以保护和偏好国家和同胞为标准的道德路径。本文把这些丰富的立场，以及它们所提供的比较点，作为一个更好地理解国际政治中国家主义伦理的可能性和局限性的机会。具体来说，本文致力于说明四点：（1）以国家、同胞和国家利益为优先的道德既不是不可能的，也不是矛盾的；（2）这种观点可以构成一个复杂的理论立场；（3）它可以以完全不同的方式来构思，包括关于它所呼吁的价值来源和它认为重要的人；（4）这些差异具有深远的实际影响。在促进西方和中国国际关系理论之间的对话方面，这一分析不仅有助于我们探索清华路径的“道义现实主义”如何与古典现实主义和国际关系规范理论中的立场相关联，而且还有助于评估其理论交汇点和分歧点的实际意义。

【原文】In this article, we identify—and interrogate—one thematic thread that is intricately woven throughprominent positions within classical realism, normative international relations (IR) theory, and what ZhangFeng (2012) has called Chinese IR’s “Tsinghua approach.” This thread is the often-controversial notionof astatist ethic for international politics or an ethical perspective that grants priority to one’s state, fellowcitizens, and the national interest. Positions within each of these theoretical traditions—what we label “egoistic realism” and “responsible realism” within the classical realist tradition, “communitarian realism”and “impartialist statism” within normative IR theory, and what others have described as “moral realism”within the Tsinghua approach—share a commitment to an ethical approach variously defined in terms of theprotection of, and preference for, one’s state and compatriots. We take this rich collection of positions, andthe points of comparison that it affords, as an opportunity to better understand the possibilities and limits of astatist ethic for international politics. Specifically, we endeavour to illustrate four points: (1) that a moralitydefined in terms of the priority of the state, one’s fellow citizens, and the national interest is neither

impossible nor a contradiction in terms; (2) that such a perspective can constitute a sophisticated theoretical

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position; (3) that it can be conceived in radically different ways, including with respect to the source of valueto which it appeals and who it deems to matter; and (4) that these differences have profound practical

consequences. In terms of contributing to a conversation between Western and Chinese IRtheory, thisanalysis helps us not only to explore how the “moral realism” of the Tsinghua approach relates to positionswithin classical realism and normative IR theory but also to evaluate the practical implications of its pointsof theoretical convergence and divergence.

3. 领导力分析范式的升级（Upgrading the Paradigm of Leadership Analysis）阎学通，清华大学国际关系研究院院长。

【摘要】领导力分析一直是研究国际关系的传统范式。道义现实主义理论在解释大国领导力与体系层面国际变化之间的关系时，提高了这一范式的科学严谨性。在方法上，道义现实主义使用道义作为标准来划分国际领导力，这也是关键的自变量。这一理论的发展是为了提高现实主义对大国兴衰这一常见历史现象的解释力。这些外交政策建议并非以中国为中心，而是从道义现实主义理论中推断出来的——这些建议是描述性的，而不是规范性的——并适用于中国和其他大国。由于系统分析理论未能解释全球秩序从全球化到反全球化的转变，领导力分析范式值得考虑。它或许确实为探究当前在主要大国盛行的民粹主义领袖与日益增长的反全球化趋势之间的关系提供了一个线索。【原文】Leadership analysis has been a traditional paradigm for studying international relations. The theoryof moral realism improves this paradigm’s scientific rigour when explaining the relationship betweentheleadership of major powers and system-level international changes. Methodologically, moral realismusesmorality as the criterion to categorise international leadership, the key independent variable. The theoryisdeveloped to improve realism’s explanatory power regarding the common historical phenomenon of theriseand fall of great powers. Rather than being Sino-centric, the foreign policy recommendations extrapolatedfrom the theory of moral realism—which are descriptive rather than prescriptive—are applicable tobothChina and other major powers. Since theories of systemic analysis have failed to explain the transitionof

global order from globalisation to the counter-globalisation, the paradigm of leadership analysis is worthconsideration. It may indeed provide a vector of enquiry regarding the correlation between the current

prevalence of populist leadership in major powers and the growing counter-globalisation trend.

4. 关系主义解析：秦亚青的世界政治理论述评（Relationalism(s) Unpacked: EngagingYaqing Qin’s Theory of World Politics）

Stefano Guzzini，欧洲大学学院政治与社会科学系教授，日内瓦研究生院国际关系与政治学系兼职教授

【摘要】本着对话的精神，本文试图在谈话中将秦亚青的世界政治关系理论与他所关注的（主要是英美）个人主义和理性主义之外的各种西方理论联系起来。这一分析的核心部分是秦亚青的关系主义，它提供了不同层次的理论化之间的联系:作为本体论，它允许我们接近不同的世界观或宇宙论；作为一种理论，它旨在理解和解释政治家的行为；作为一个阐释性的桥梁，它让外界理解中国外交政策行动的意义；作为一种策略，它发展了儒家启发的实用格言，并提供了评估行为体是否遵守这些格言的

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方法。本文将在这些层面上剖析他的关系主义。本文认为，秦亚青通过试图在所有层面上与单一理论紧密匹配（这本身就是一项令人尊敬的努力，许多学者遗憾地退缩了），使得他没有充分利用他的本体论见解。他通过试图提供有助于外部观察者正确解读中国在国际事务中的行为的潜在启示，使得实践被置于理论中解读，因此他的关系主义变得不必要地以能动者为中心，最终低估了非个人及非冲突性权力（或支配）的关系。这一举动也预示着其他理论解决方案可能更忠实于他的本体论，如可以与之对话的社会认知论。最后，在外交政策战略层面，本文探讨了秦亚青设想的开放外交进程与赫尔辛基进程之间的相似之处，以及（真正的）多边主义所设想的扩散互惠体系中的信任或信心建立措施。【原文】In a spirit of dialogue, this article engages Yaqing Qin’s relational theory of world politics inaconversation by trying to relate it to Western theoretical partners outside of his (mainly Anglo-American)

individualist and rationalist focus. The central piece of the analysis is Qin’s relationalism, which providesthe link between different levels of theorizing: as an ontology, it allows us to approach a different

Weltanschauung or cosmology; as a theory, it purports to understand and explain how politicians act; asahermeneutic bridge, it allows outsiders to understand the meaning of Chinese foreign policy actions; andasastrategy, it develops Confucian-inspired practical maxims and provides means to assess whether actors liveup to them. This article will unpack his relationalism at these levels. It argues that by trying to closelymatcha single theory at all levels—in itself a highly respectable endeavor from which many scholars regrettablyrecoil—Qin underutilizes his ontological insights. By trying to provide the underlying inspirations that

should help outside observers to correctly interpret Chinese conduct in world affairs, practice is readbackinto theory so that his relationalism becomes unnecessarily agency-centric and ends up underestimatingrelations of impersonal and non-conflictual power or domination. The move also forestalls other theoretical

solutions arguably more faithful to his ontology, such as social theories of recognition with which it couldbein dialogue. Finally, on the level of foreign policy strategy, the article invites exploration of the similaritiesbetween the open diplomatic process envisaged by Qin and the Helsinki process, as well as trust or

confidence building measures in a system of diffuse reciprocity, as envisaged by (true) multilateralism.

5. 中庸辩证法：通往关系世界的桥梁（The Zhongyong Dialectic: A Bridge intotheRelational World）

秦亚青，山东大学政治与公共管理学院国际政治系教授

【摘要】在我的关系理论中存在着三种张力，即本体与行为之间、结构与过程之间、实体与程序之间。在这些紧张关系的背后是一个至关重要的问题：如何识别主体和客体，并理解其中的支配-从属权力关系？如果从二元论的角度观察，这些表面上的不一致会出现，但从中庸辩证法的角度来看，这些不一致可能会消失。中庸辩证法作为一种认识论和方法论手段，首先不假设二元二分法。它相信内在的关系和动态的可转化性，认为基于差异而非同质的互动产生健康的生活，并认为主体与客体、结构与过程、实质与程序——所有这些被构建为二元对立的范畴，实际上都是作为整体的相关部分相互转化的。全球社会的演变，从民族国家的国际社会，到人类的全球社会，再到地球上（或更远）所有人的行星社会，清楚地表明了跨越表面上的主客体鸿沟的关系可转换性。权力关系是存在的，但任何单方面行使权力都是短暂的，因为强权（power over）不会持久，而赋权（power to）则可能会。

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【原文】Three tensions are said to exist in my relational theory, i.e. between ontology and behavior, betweenstructure and process, and between substance and procedure. Underlying these tensions is a crucial question:

How to identify the subject and object and understand the domination–subordination power relationshiptherein? These seeming inconsistencies appear if observed through a dualistic lens but may well disappear

when viewed from the zhongyong dialectic, which, as an epistemological and methodological device,

assumes no binary dichotomy in the first place. It believes in immanent relationality and dynamictransformability, holding that interaction based on difference rather than homogeneity generates healthylifeand arguing that subject and object, structure and process, substance and procedure—all these categoriesconstructed as dichotomous opposites are in fact mutually transformable as related parts of a whole. Theevolution of global society, from international society of nation-states, to global society of humans, andtoplanetary society of all on earth (or beyond), clearly indicates the relational transformability across theostensible subject–object divide. Power relations exist, but any unilateral exercise of power is ephemeral, for

power over will not last, while power to will.

【编译：任雨欣】【责任编辑：封欣怡】《欧亚研究》（Europe-Asia Studies）Europe-Asia Studies，Vol. 76, No. 4, 2024

1. 解开蛛丝：克罗地亚和塞尔维亚的政策学习与非正式网络（Untangling the GossamerWeb: Policy Learning and Informal Networks in Croatia and Serbia）Alexander Mesarovich，斯特灵大学历史与政治系研究助理

【摘要】南斯拉夫解体三十年后，前加盟共和国的发展道路出现了分歧，斯洛文尼亚和克罗地亚加入了欧盟，而其他国家则仍对欧洲充满希望。本文从政策学习的角度分析了这一差异，将加入欧盟的过程概念化为候选国的学习过程，并利用社会网络分析克罗地亚和塞尔维亚议会中的非正式政治网络对《欧亚研究》（Europe-Asia Studies）为每年出刊 10 期的学术 期刊 ， 由 Routledge 代 表格 拉 斯格 大 学中 东 欧 研究 部 门（University of Glasgow）出版。主要关注前苏联地区国家的政治、经济、社会议题及其 20 世纪的历史。

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其入盟过程的影响。研究发现，克罗地亚的非正式网络促进了入盟进程，塞尔维亚的非正式网络则限制了入盟进程。

【原文】Thirty years on from the collapse of Yugoslavia, the paths of the former constituent republics havediverged, with Slovenia and Croatia acceding to the European Union and the rest remaining hopeful

Europeans. This article analyses this discrepancy through the lens of policy learning, conceptualisingtheprocess of accession as one of learning on the part of the candidate state, and uses social network analysis toidentify the impact of informal political networks in parliaments of Croatia and Serbia on their respectiveEUaccession processes. It finds that informal networks in Croatia enabled accession while those in Serbiaconstrained it.

2. 洛坎规则？共产主义精英与 1989—1990 年南斯拉夫各共和国选举制度的选择（Rokkan Rules? Communist Elites and the Choice of Electoral Systems in the YugoslavRepublics, 1989-1990）

Josip Glaurdić，卢森堡大学政治学副教授

Ensar Muharemović，卢森堡大学博士生

【摘要】本文利用之前被忽视的南斯拉夫各共和国的案例，重新审视 1989 年至1990 年“转型时期”首次选举的选举制度是如何形成的问题。通过探索相关决策者创建的档案和其他同期资料，本文以洛坎对选举制度设计的解释为基础。然而，本文并不如洛坎一样将政党视为单一或团结的行为体，反而侧重于分析执政党的领导层和主导派系，并表明他们对选举规则的偏好服务于其党内野心，是党内权力能力的反映。

【原文】We use the previously neglected cases of the Yugoslav republics to revisit the question of howelectoral systems were formed for the first elections during the transition from communismin 1989-1990.

By exploring archival and other sources created contemporaneously by the relevant decision-makers, webuild on Rokkanian interpretations of electoral system design. Unlike Rokkan, however, we do not seeparties as unitary or united actors. Our analysis instead focuses on the leadership and the dominant wings of

the ruling parties and shows that their preferences regarding electoral rules served their intra-party ambitionsand reflected their intra-party power capacities.

3. 罗马尼亚平等机构的歧视蔓延、任务扩展与政治化（Discrimination Creep, MandateExpansion and the Politicisation of Romania’s Equality Agency）Liviu Andreescu，布加勒斯特大学行政与商学院教授

Gabriel Andreescu，蒂米什瓦拉西部大学政治学博士学院教授

【摘要】在有关平等机构和官僚扩张的文献背景下，本文研究了罗马尼亚反歧视机构——国家反歧视委员会（NCCD）当前的信任危机。本文认为，通过概念蔓延的过程，歧视被宽泛地定义，以至于越来越多的微不足道的行为现在也受到制裁。这导致了策略性和机会主义请愿的增加，带来了两个后果：

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一是提高了对该机构政治控制的风险；二是该机构对歧视的概念管理日益困难。我们通过分析理事会关于“歧视性言论”的判例法来记录“歧视蔓延”，然而本文重点仍集中于导致歧视蔓延的官僚机构、专业知识和激进主义的相互作用。

【原文】Against the background of literature on equality bodies and bureaucratic expansion, we examinethecurrent crisis of confidence in Romania’s anti-discrimination agency, the National Council for CombatingDiscrimination (NCCD), a quasi-court. We argue that, through a process of conceptual creep, discriminationhas been defined so generously that increasingly trivial acts are now sanctioned. This has generatedincreased strategic and opportunistic petitioning, with two consequences: raising the stakes of political

control over the agency; and the agency’s increasingly difficult conceptual management of discrimination.

We document ‘discrimination creep’ by analysing the Council’s case law on ‘discriminatory speech’, thoughour focus stays on the interaction of bureaucracy, expertise and activism which has enabled creep.

4. （历史）爱的政治：关于爱国主义、民族历史和对克里米亚的吞并（The Politicsof(Historical) Love: On Patriotism, National History and the Annexation of Crimea）Dmitriy Skulskiy，鲁宾学术中心移民与社会融合研究所研究员

【摘要】本文展示了与克里米亚“统一”的假定历史重要性如何确保俄罗斯公众支持其吞并克里米亚。基于对俄罗斯爱国话语的分析，本文展示了在其框架内“人民”、“俄罗斯”和“祖国”等术语如何与神圣的“非人类”相对应。它们与人类之间的本体论鸿沟是通过民族历史来调节的：历史由人类主体创造，但是最终属于俄罗斯民族。在此背景下，热爱俄罗斯就意味着确保俄罗斯历史的伟大。吞并的历史意义使其具有爱国主义色彩，因而是一种可取的行动。

【原文】This article shows how the presumed historical importance of ‘unification’ with Crimea ensuredRussian public support for its annexation. Based on the analysis of patriotic discourse in Russia, I showhowwithin its frame the terms ‘People’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Motherland’ correspond to sacred non-human beings. Theontological gap between them and humans is mediated by means of national history: created by humansubjects, history ultimately belongs to the Russian nation. In this context, loving Russia means ensuringthegreatness of Russian history. The historical significance of the annexation made it patriotic, and hence, adesirable course of action.

5. 勃列日涅夫时代批评信的写作与审议（Critical Letter Writing and DeliberationDuring the Brezhnev Era）

Andrew Buck，南印第安纳大学社会学副教授

【摘要】据说勃列日涅夫时代是一段政治停滞的时期，本文分析了该时期苏联公民写给报纸和当局的信件。公民们以个人或集体、署名或匿名的方式写批评信，要求解决问题。当局对公民关注的问题做出回应，这些问题大多非常具体且非系统，当局还利用这些信件来监督公众舆论。该时期苏联的写信实践，使公民能够向当局问责，同时也为领导人提供了通过采取行动使其权力合法化的机会。

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【 原 文 】 This article analyses letters sent by Soviet citizens to newspapers and authorities duringtheBrezhnev era, supposedly a period of political stagnation. Citizens wrote critical letters, individuallyandcollectively, signed and anonymously, to have problems solved. Authorities responded to citizen concerns,

which were mostly very specific and non-systemic, and also used the letters to monitor public opinion. Thepractice of letter writing in the Soviet Union in this period enabled citizens to hold authorities to account

while also providing leaders with the opportunity to legitimise their authority by taking action.

6. 重返家乡的坎坷：俄罗斯南部的叙利亚切尔克斯人（A Troubled ReturntotheHomeland: Syrian Circassians in Southern Russia）

Andrey Korotayev，俄罗斯高等经济大学社会政治不稳定风险监测实验室主任，教授Leonid Issaev，俄罗斯高等经济大学社会政治不稳定风险检测实验室副主任，副教授Yevgeniy Ivanov，俄罗斯高等经济大学社会政治不稳定风险监测实验室初级研究员Alisa Shishkina，俄罗斯高等经济大学社会政治不稳定风险监测实验室高级研究员【摘要】叙利亚人道主义危机加剧了俄罗斯的切尔克斯问题。由于祖先从北高加索前往中东，同时也为躲避战争，数以百计的叙利亚的切尔克斯人（阿迪格人）将俄罗斯作为目的地。尽管俄罗斯有能力接纳大量移民，但叙利亚切尔克斯人在进入俄罗斯和在俄罗斯居留方面仍面临重重困难。在接收叙利亚阿迪格人的问题上，俄罗斯政府在以下方面存有疑虑：（1）索契奥运会前切尔克斯激进主义日益高涨；（2）ISIS 的渗透；（3）南部地区紧张的民族关系。尽管如此，由于当地阿迪格人的支持，许多叙利亚切尔克斯人在俄罗斯定居。本文的研究结果基于 2017 年在卡拉恰伊-切尔克斯西亚和2018年在阿迪格进行的访谈与民意调查。

【原文】The humanitarian crisis in Syria has fuelled the Circassian issue in Russia. Escaping fromthe war,

hundreds of Syrian Circassians (Adyghe) chose Russia as their destination because their ancestors cametothe Middle East from the North Caucasus. Syrian Circassians have faced difficulties in entering Russiaandstaying there regardless of the state’s ability to accept a large number of immigrants. In the case of receivingSyrian Adyghe, Russian authorities were suspicious about: (1) growing Circassian activismbeforetheOlympics in Sochi; (2) ISIS infiltration; and (3) ethnic tensions in the Southern regions. Nevertheless, manySyrian Circassians settled in Russia due to the support extended by local Adyghe. Our findings are basedoninterviews and public polls conducted in Karachay-Cherkessia in 2017 and Adygea in 2018.

7. 评估变化中的中俄关系：后冷战时期双边合作的纵向分析（Assessing the ChangingSino – Russian Relationship: A Longitudinal Analysis of Bilateral CooperationinthePost-Cold War Period）

Maria Papageorgiou，英国埃克塞特大学政治系讲师

Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira，葡萄牙米尼奥大学政治科学研究中心政治学和国际关系助理教授【摘要】中俄关系对全球秩序至关重要。围绕中俄关系如何随着时间推移而发展的问题——加强、削弱还是保持不变——本文对 1992 年至 2019 年间中俄关系的演变进行了定量分析。本研究开发了一个

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原创指数——双边合作强度（BCI）指数，旨在衡量双边（中俄）合作并考虑具体（军事、经济、政治）维度。虽然研究结果证实，中国和俄罗斯确实以渐进的方式加强了合作，在2014 年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后并没有出现明显的倒退，但其并没有证实文献中经常提到的“戏剧性变化”的说法。【原文】The Sino–Russian relationship is of fundamental importance to the global order. Followingthequestion of how this relationship has developed over time—whether it has strengthened, weakenedor

remained constant—we present a quantitative analysis of its evolution between 1992 and 2019. To this end,

the study develops an original index, the Bilateral Cooperation Intensity (BCI) Index, aimed at measuringbilateral (Sino–Russian) cooperation and considering specific (military, economic, political) dimensions.

While our findings verify the assumption that China and Russia have indeed strengthened their cooperationin a progressive manner, with no apparent setback following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the resultsdo not corroborate the claims of dramatic change frequently presented in the literature.

【编译：汪平平】【责任编辑：严瑾怡】《外交政策分析》（Foreign Policy Analysis）Foreign Policy Analysis，Vol. 20, No. 2, 2024

1. 自动动机评分和国际危机行为（Automated Motive Scoring and International CrisisBehavior）

《外交政策分析》（Foreign Policy Analysis）杂志是由牛津大学出版社代表国际研究协会出版的季刊。该期刊旨在以比较或具体案例的方式研究外交政策决策的过程、效果、原因或结果。2023 年期刊影响因子为 2.2。

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Michael D Young，美国奥尔巴尼大学应急准备、国土安全和网络安全学院助理教授，近期任俄亥俄州立大学教授

【摘要】尽管隐性动机已经得到很好地证实，但隐性动机的编码一直是一个耗时且困难的手动过程。本文首先评估成就需求（Need for Achievement）、归属需求（Need for Affiliation）和权力需求（Needfor Power）的自动动机编码方案，其次评估这三种动机与危机引发之间的关系，以及评估其他心理变量对于危机行为的解释力。研究结果通过手动编码证实了成就需求和权力需求编码方案的收敛效度（convergent validity），并支持了权力需要与危机行为之间的显著关系。权力需求每增加一个单位，领导者发起危机的可能性就会增加一倍。纳入其他先前研究过的心理变量，能够获取结果更显著的模型。数据集的范围（来自 93 个不同国家的 154 名领导人）增强了研究结果的分量，并为进一步研究提供了机会。

【 原 文 】 Although implicit motives are well established, coding for implicit motives has beenatime-consuming and difficult manual process. This study (i) evaluates automated motive coding schemes for

Need for Achievement, Need for Affiliation, and Need for Power, (ii) assesses the relationship betweenthesethree motives and crisis initiation, and (iii) assesses the explanatory power of other psychological variablesfor crisis behavior. The results establish the convergent validity of the Need for Achievement and Needfor

Power coding schemes with hand coding and support findings of a significant relationship between Needfor

Power and crisis behavior. A unit increase in Need for Power doubles the probability that a leader will

initiate a crisis. Even stronger models were obtained by including other previously studied psychological

variables. The scope of the dataset (154 leaders across a diverse set of 93 countries) lends weight tothefindings and provides many opportunities for additional research.

2. 解读角色理论中的角色转换：拜登政府将德国转变为对华关系中忠实盟友角色的政策 （ Unpacking Altercasting in Role Theory: The Biden Administration's PolicyofAltercasting Germany into a Faithful Ally Role in Relations with China）Kai Oppermann，德国开姆尼茨工业大学人文学院政治科学研究所国际关系教授【摘要】本文对外交政策分析中的象征互动角色理论做出了贡献，重点关注角色转换（altercasting）的概念。“角色互换”指的是在角色关系中，通过言语和非言语行为将另一个国家塑造成与自身角色互补的角色。本文建议更加关注“进行”角色互换的行为体的主动性，以更好地理解其运作方式。为此，本文提出一个分析框架来解析角色互换行为体的主动性。该框架涵盖了行动体参与角色互换的前提条件、角色互换与国内政治的相互作用以及可用的角色互换技巧。本文通过对拜登政府在2021年底新政府上台时努力将德国塑造成针对中国的“忠实盟友”角色的案例研究来检验这一框架。通过对美国外交政策界的专家访谈，案例研究表明拜登政府对德国有明确的角色期望，也了解德国联合政府各政党之间的意见平衡。拜登政府运用了自我展示、信号承认与否认、以及提出直接行为要求等角色互换技巧。

【原文】The article contributes to scholarship on symbolic interactionist role theory in Foreign PolicyAnalysis, focusing on the concept of altercasting. Altercasting refers to verbal and non-verbal state behaviors

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in a role relationship to cast another state into roles that are complementary to its own roles. The articlesuggests putting more attention on the agency of the actor “doing” the altercasting to gain a better

understanding of how altercasting works. To this purpose, the article develops a framework to unpacktheagency of the altercasting actor. The framework addresses the preconditions for actors to engageinaltercasting, the interplay of altercasting with domestic politics, and the available altercasting techniques.

The article illustrates this framework in a case study on the efforts of the Biden administration to altercast

Germany into a “faithful ally” role vis-à-vis China when the new German government transitionedintooffice in late 2021. Building on evidence from expert interviews among the U.S. foreign policy community,

the case study demonstrates that the Biden administration had clear role expectations of Germanyandunderstood the balance of opinion between the German coalition parties. The Biden administration usedthealtercasting techniques of self-presentation, signaling approval, and disapproval and making direct

behavioral demands.

3. 外国援助在争取内战各方同意维持和平方面的作用（The Role of ForeignAidinProcuring Civil War Party Consent to Peacekeeping）

Johannes Karreth，美国乌西努斯学院政治与国际关系系副教授

Timothy J A Passmore，少校，美国弗吉尼亚军事学院助理教授

Jaroslav Tir，美国科罗拉多大学博尔德分校政治学教授

【摘要】成功的维和行动在很大程度上取决于冲突各方对干预行动的无限制同意。然而，同意常常被一方或多方拒绝或限制，他们认为和平的代价高于继续战斗的代价。本文强调以外国发展援助形式提供的国际经济奖励在克服取得同意的障碍方面的作用。本文认为，过去的援助发出了一个可信的信号，即如果交战各方朝着和平的方向努力，未来将获得冲突后的物质利益。这种对未来利益的附加条件因此激励交战各方为和平与稳定而努力，包括不受限制地同意维持和平特派团。对冷战后的119 次内战的分析和对东帝汶的简要叙述表明，外国援助大大增加了无限制同意的可能性。本文研究结果对国际影响国内政治争端的文献研究和维和行动有效性的研究具有启示意义。

【原文】Successful peacekeeping depends heavily on the conflict parties providing unrestricted consent tothe intervention. Consent is, however, often withheld or limited by one or more parties who calculateahigher cost to peace than to continued fighting. We highlight the role of international economic incentives inthe form of foreign development aid in overcoming hurdles to obtaining consent. We argue that past aidsends a credible signal of future, post-conflict material benefits if the belligerents work toward peace. Thisconditionality of future benefits thereby incentivizes the belligerents to work toward peace and stability,

including providing unrestricted consent to peacekeeping missions. Analyses of 119 post-Cold War civil

wars and a brief narrative of East Timor demonstrate that foreign aid significantly and substantially increasesthe likelihood of unrestricted consent. The findings have implications for the literature on international

influences on domestic political contestation and for research on the effectiveness of peacekeepingoperations.

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4. 禁运、武器和暴力：武器禁运对平民目标的有条件影响（Embargoes, Weapons, andViolence: The Conditional Effects of Arms Embargoes on Civilian Targeting）Amira Jadoon，美国克莱姆森大学政治学系助理教授

Bryan R Early，美国纽约州立大学奥尔巴尼分洛克菲勒公共事务政策学院的政治学教授兼研究副院长【摘要】武器禁运的一个主要目标是通过限制获得外国武器来减轻目标国内冲突的人道主义影响。本文调查了禁运政府如何调整其暴力策略以应对武器进口限制。本文的理论是，削弱政府军事实力的武器禁运可能会无意中增加它们对平民镇压的依赖，以此作为应对国内威胁的另一种方法。然而，本文预计目标政府或者从那些不参与的行为体、或者从那些不合规的供应商那里获得武器的能力将起到缓解作用。针对 1989 年至 2004 年间武器禁运影响的一项全球研究支持了本文论点，同时证明接受的武器数量和提供武器的人都很重要。本文研究结果表明，实施武器禁运的政策制定者应该考虑到针对平民的暴力增加是一种潜在的意想不到的后果，并密切监测目标政府对镇压的使用。【原文】A primary goal of arms embargoes is to mitigate the humanitarian effects of conflict withintarget

states by restricting access to foreign weaponry. Within this study, we investigate howembargoedgovernments adapt their violent strategies in response to restrictions on arms imports. We theorize that armsembargoes that undermine governments’ military strength may inadvertently increase their relianceoncivilian repression as an alternative approach to countering domestic threats. However, we expect that

targeted governments’ ability to acquire weapons from non-participating or non-compliant suppliers will

have a mitigating effect. A global examination of the effects of arms embargoes between 1989 and2004supports our argument and also suggests that both the levels of arms received and who supplies themmatter.

Our findings suggest that policymakers who employ arms embargoes should consider increased violenceagainst civilians as a potential unintended consequence and closely monitor target governments’ useof

repression.

5. 政党重要吗？政党立场和欧洲选民对经济和政治全球化的态度（Do Parties Matter?Party Positions and European Voters’ Attitudes toward Economic andPolitical

Globalization）

Alex Honeker，美国德克萨斯农工大学卡塔尔分校政治学系教学助理教授【摘要】政党立场在多大程度上影响选民对全球化的经济和政治方面的态度？全球化最初是一个伴随着左右冲突维度的问题，但它日益将主流政党与非主流政党区分开来。本文认为政党帮助公民形成对全球化问题的看法。本文使用选民对全球化的态度和政党立场的数据，从经济和政治两个方面检验全球化态度的供给侧理论。保持需求侧因素（如经济自身利益和倾向/价值观）不变，本文发现政党立场强烈影响选民对经济和政治全球化的看法，其效果与教育相似。此外，本文发现来自左翼和右翼民粹主义政党特征的影响比主流政党的影响要负面得多，这与之前精英阶层对这些政党家族定位的研究结果如出一辙。最后，绿色政党特征在经济和政治维度上显示出相互矛盾的结果，绿党特征对选民的经济全球化产生负面影响，而对政治全球化产生积极影响。本文的发现要求对全球化态度的供给侧决定因素进行更深入的探索。

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【原文】To what extent do party positions influence voters’ attitudes toward the economic and political

aspects of globalization? Initially an issue following a left-right dimension of conflict, globalizationincreasingly divides mainstream from nonmainstream parties. In this study, I argue that parties help citizensform opinions on globalization issues. I then use data on voters’ attitudes and party positions onglobalization to test this supply-side theory of globalization attitudes on both economic and political

dimensions. Holding demand-side factors such as economic self-interest and predispositions/values constant,

I find that party positions strongly affect voters’ views on economic and political globalization, withtheeffect being similar to that of education. Moreover, I find that the effect of cues from left- and right-populist

parties is much more negative than that of mainstream parties, replicating previous elite-level findings onthepositioning of these party families. Finally, green party cues show conflicting results for the economicandpolitical dimensions, with green cues affecting voters negatively on economic globalization but positivelyonpolitical globalization. The findings in this study call for a deeper exploration of the supply-sidedeterminants of globalization attitudes.

6. 欧盟成员国对乌克兰的支持（EU Member State Support to Ukraine）Tim Haesebrouck，比利时根特大学国际和欧洲研究所助理教授

【摘要】2022 年 2 月 24 日俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后，欧盟及其成员国向乌克兰提供了前所未有的军事、人道主义和财政援助。然而，尽管一些欧盟成员国向乌克兰提供了不成比例的高水平支持，但其他成员国承诺的援助水平却出乎意料地低。本文旨在以军事负担分担理论为基础，解释欧盟成员国对乌克兰支持程度的差异。本文采用了共存分析（Coincidence Analysis）的创新拟合稳健性程序。分析结果表明，由军事负担分担理论导出的条件可以解释对乌克兰的支持。更具体地说，支持的模式（主要）由每个成员国面临的来自俄罗斯的威胁程度、过去的军事投资和公众舆论来解释。相反，与经常被检验和证实的剥削假说（exploitation hypothesis）相左，成员国的经济规模对它们对乌克兰的支持没有影响。

【原文】The EU and its member states have provided an unprecedented amount of military, humanitarianand financial aid to Ukraine after Russia's attack on February 24, 2022. However, while some EUmember

states have provided a disproportionately high level of support to Ukraine, other member states committedan unexpectedly low level of aid. This article aims to explain the diverging levels of EUmember statesupport to Ukraine by building on theories of military burden-sharing. Methodologically, it applies theinnovative fit robustness procedure of Coincidence Analysis (CNA). The results of the analysis indicatethat

conditions derived from theories of military burden-sharing can explain support to Ukraine. Morespecifically, the pattern of support was (mainly) explained by the level of threat that each member state facedfrom Russia, past military investments and public opinion. Conversely, in contrast to the frequentlytestedand confirmed exploitation hypothesis, the economic size of the member states did not have an impact ontheir support to Ukraine.

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7. 什么是爱国者？针对中国和美国的跨国研究（What is a Patriot? ACross-National

Study in China and the United State）

Eddy S. F. Yeung，美国埃默里大学政治学系博士生

王梦桥，中国对外经济贸易大学国际发展政治经济学系讲师

【摘要】爱国主义是一股无处不在的政治力量。然而，我们却对大众最初如何理解“爱国”的含义所知甚少。本文在全国范围内开展了群众对爱国主义认识的调查。通过对两个全球超级大国——中国和美国——的平行全国调查，本文揭示了国家之间和国家内部对“爱国”的理解存在本质上的差异，以及不同的理解如何映射到不同的政策偏好。特别是，虽然文献对（良性的）爱国主义和（恶性的）民族主义进行了区分，但本文发现大多数中国受访者——以及大约三分之一的美国受访者——将爱国主义理解为民族主义。对爱国主义的民族主义理解反过来又与更强硬的外交政策倾向相对应。通过分析民间对爱国主义的直觉，并将其定位到现有的学术辩论中，本文在学术文献及其试图解释的大众政治行为之间创建了关联。

【原文】Patriotism is a pervasive political force. However, not much is known about how people understandwhat it means to be “patriotic” in the first place. We conduct a cross-country study of mass understandingsof patriotism. Through parallel national surveys in two global superpowers—China and the UnitedStates—we uncover the substantively different understandings of what it means to be “patriotic” betweenand within countries, and how the different understandings may map onto different policy preferences. Inparticular, while the literature draws a distinction between (benign) patriotism and (malign) nationalism, wefind that most Chinese respondents—and about a third of American respondents—understand patriotismasnationalism. The nationalistic understanding of patriotism, in turn, corresponds to more hawkish foreignpolicy preferences. By unpacking folk intuitions about patriotism and mapping them onto existing scholarlydebates, we bridge the distance between the academic literature and the mass political behavior it seeks toexplain.

8. 国际关系定序变量结果中的最高项膨胀现象（Top-Category Inflation inOrderedInternational Relations Outcomes）

Benjamin E Bagozzi，美国特拉华大学政治科学与国际关系系副教授

Minnie M Joo，美国马萨诸塞大学洛厄尔分校政治学系助理教授

umba Mukherjee，美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学政治学系教授

【摘要】定序因变量广泛应用于国际关系中。由于不同的过程，这些定序因变量经常会在其最高结果类别中受观察值膨胀的影响。将标准定序概率（standard ordered probit）和定序logit 模型应用于此类定序度量将无法捕获这些不同的过程，因此通常会产生有偏差的推论。然而，国际关系研究人员忽略了定序结果变量中高类别变量中观测值膨胀的可能性。本文旨在让研究人员对国际关系中定序结果的高膨胀更加敏感。然后，本文直观地将广泛使用的零膨胀定序概率模型（zero-inflated orderedprobit

model）扩展到最高项膨胀（top-category inflated）背景，提供方式以促进定序结果中最高项膨胀的正确建模。最后，本文提供了在贸易政治和政治镇压相关的已发表研究的两项应用。这些应用共同验证了本文所提出的工具在诊断和建模国际关系结果中高类别膨胀值方面的实效和方法论潜力。

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【原文】Ordered dependent variables are widely employed in international relations (IR). These ordereddependent variables often suffer from inflated observations in their highest outcome category due to distinct

processes. The application of standard ordered probit and ordered logit models to such ordinal measures will

fail to capture these distinct processes, often producing biased inferences as a result. Yet IR researchers havethus far ignored the potential for top-category inflation in ordered outcome variables. We sensitizeresearchers to top-category inflation in ordered IR outcomes. We then intuitively extend the widelyusedzero-inflated ordered probit model to the top-category inflated setting, providing resources to facilitatetheproper modeling of top-category inflation in ordered outcomes. Finally, we provide two applications topublished IR research related to trade politics and political repression. Together, these applications illustratethe substantive and methodological potentials of our proposed tools for diagnosing and modelingtop-category inflation in IR outcomes.

【编译：林怡娉】【责任编辑：严瑾怡】《华盛顿季刊》（The Washington Quarterly）The Washington Quarterly，Vol.47, No.1, 2024

1. 以色列在加沙的六种选择（Six Options for Israel in Gaza）Daniel Byman，乔治敦大学外交学院教授

Riley McCabe，战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）的项目经理和研究助理

Alexander Palmer，战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）的副研究员

【摘要】作为对 2023 年 10 月 7 日毁灭性袭击的回应，以色列领导人声称他们寻求“摧毁”哈马斯——这个目标说起来容易，做起来难。以色列的行动——轰炸加沙、派兵杀害哈马斯战士和摧毁哈马斯的基础设施、袭击加沙和该地区的哈马斯领导人——已在加沙杀害了 3 万多名巴勒斯坦人，其中包括《华盛顿季刊》（The Washington Quarterly）由乔治·华盛顿 大 学 的 埃 利 奥 特 国 际 事 务 学 院 主 办 ， 并 由 Taylor &

Francis 出版，是一本全球安全事务期刊，提供关于全球战略变化、趋势和关系及其公共政策影响的不同观点。其撰稿人来自全球，反映了不同的政治、地区和专业观点。其2021 年的影响因子为 2.013，在 96 种国际关系期刊中排名第 47。

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许多儿童。为了声援哈马斯，伊朗支持的组织对以色列和美国在该地区的目标发动了袭击。可以理解，如果以色列不愿让哈马斯取得胜利，并寻求确保自身安全，那么它还有什么选择呢？【原文】In response to its devastating October 7, 2023 attack, Israeli leaders have stated that they seekto“destroy” Hamas—a goal easier in rhetoric than in reality. Israel's actions—bombing Gaza, sending introopsto kill Hamas fighters and destroy Hamas’ infrastructure, and targeting Hamas leaders in Gaza and aroundthe region—have killed over 30,000 Palestinians in Gaza, including many children. In solidarity with Hamas,

Iranian-backed groups have conducted attacks against Israeli and US targets around the region. If,

understandably, Israel is loath to allow Hamas a victory and seeks to ensure its security，what options doesit

have?

2. 大国冲突不断，核风险上升（Nuclear Risks Rise as Great-Power Conflict Goes On）Adam T. Biggs，美国海军心理学家

【摘要】历史上，当强国之间寻求武装冲突时，大国竞争会带来毁灭性的后果。在现代，大国还拥有核武器，这加剧了大国间战争的潜在破坏力。尽管可以事后解释起因，并将其应用于当前的国际关系，但使用核武器的决定往往与高层领导的心理有关，也与当代地缘政治条件有关。在考虑这些决定时，必须考虑到长期战争是如何导致参与者的道德操守下降的。随着报复和支配的主题日益突出，道德标准的下降会使决策出现偏差。

【原文】Great-power competition has historically imposed devastating consequences when powerful nationsseek armed conflict with one another. In the modern era, great powers also possess nuclear weapons, whichexacerbates the potential destruction of any war among them. Although causes can be interpretedinhindsight and applied to current international relations，the decision to use nuclear weapons is oftenabout

the psychology of the senior leadership as much as it is contemporary geopolitical conditions. Thesedecisions must be considered within the context of how protracted warfare produces declining ethical

conduct among its participants. Deteriorating ethical standards can in tum bias decision-making, as themesof revenge and domination become prominent. The practical consequence is that previously irrational or

unthinkable courses of action could seem more reasonable as war progresses.

3. 处理联盟分担负担的困境（Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance Burden Sharing）Brian Blankenship，迈阿密大学政治学助理教授

【摘要】与冷战后的大部分时期相比，鼓励盟国承担更多的自卫责任变得更加重要。苏联集团的解体最初释放了美国大量的军事力量，使美国失去了同类竞争对手，似乎降低了美国盟国卷入战争的风险。结果，特别是在欧洲，盟国的能力萎缩了，而美国则集中精力在中东和非洲大部分地区发动大规模的反恐战争。但在过去十年中，随着俄罗斯的复苏、中国的崛起以及美国外交政策围绕“大国竞争”的重新定位，为常规大国战争做准备又重新成为美国的议题。随之而来的是对美国稀缺军事资源进行投资和部署的权衡。与此同时，加沙、也门和中东其他地区的冲突仍在继续对美国的资源和注意力提出

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要求。如果美国不愿意或无法独自投入足够的资源来威慑和击败某个地区的对手，那么盟国的能力将需要填补这一缺口。

【原文】Encouraging allies to shoulder more of the burden of defending themselves has become moreimportant than it was for most of the post-Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet bloc initially freedupsubstantial amounts of US military power, left the United States without a peer competitor, and seemedtoreduce the risk of war involving American allies. As a result, particularly in Europe, allied capabilities haveatrophied, while the United States focused on waging an expansive war on terrorism in much of the MiddleEast and Africa. But over the last ten years, with the resurgence of Russian expansionism, the rise of China,

and the reorientation of US foreign policy around “great power competition,” preparing for conventional

major-power war is back on the menu. With it come painful tradeoffs about where to invest and deployscarce US military resources. All the while, conflicts in Gaza, Yemen, and elsewhere in the Middle East

continue to make claims on US assets and attention. To the extent that the United States is unwillingor

unable to devote sufficient resources for deterring and defeating adversaries in one region or another onitsown, allied capabilities will need to fill the gap.

4. 欧洲战略自主：欧洲地缘政治之路（European Strategic Autonomy: The PathtoaGeopolitical Europe）

Tara Varma，布鲁金斯学会美国和欧洲中心客座研究员

【摘要】在欧洲,“战略自主”是一个充满争议的词语，无论是反对者还是拥护者都对其反应剧烈。本文阐述了这一表述的细微差别以及它成为欧洲人口头禅的原因，旨在说明战略自主的争议性并没有许多人想象的那么大。

【原文】Strategic autonomy is a loaded expression in Europe, one which inspires strong feelings frombothits detractors and its advocates. By laying out the nuances of the phrase and the reasons it has enteredEuropean parlance, this paper aims to show that strategic autonomy is less controversial than many presume.

5. 预测欧洲的核未来（Anticipating Europe’ s Nuclear Futures）Wannes Verstraete，布鲁塞尔自由大学政治学系博士研究员和助教，研究兴趣为威慑和军备控制【摘要】近年来，随着国内政治和意识形态成为美国外交政策决策的动机，美国作为欧洲大陆和平与稳定“最终保障者”的信誉受到了质疑。虽然拜登政府目前正在北约框架下支持乌克兰并加强美国在欧洲的驻军，但其主要战略重点仍然是中国。与此同时，共和党内部有一个强大的派系，他们宁愿看到美国远离或完全退出北约。例如：特朗普在其第一任期内曾质疑北约的价值，并差点退出北约。此外，随着下届总统大选的临近，对饱受战争蹂躏的乌克兰的援助在美国国会已成为政治争议的焦点。据美国众议院共和党议长迈克·约翰逊称，对乌克兰、以色列和台湾拟议的950 亿美元援助计划进行表决并不迫切。此外，2 月 10 日，特朗普在竞选集会上表示，他将 “鼓励”俄罗斯人对军事开支不足的北约盟国“为所欲为”。

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【 原 文】 The credibility of the United States as the “ultimate guarantor” of peace and stability ontheEuropean continent has come under question in recent years as domestic politics and ideologyhavemotivated US foreign policy decisions. While the Biden administration is currently supporting Ukraineandbolstering the US troop presence in Europe under NATO's framework, the administration's primary strategicfocus remains on China. Meanwhile, there is a powerful faction within the Republican Party that wouldrather see the US distance itself or withdraw entirely from NATO. Case in point: during his first term,

Trump questioned the value of the alliance and almost withdrew from it. Moreover, as the next presidential

election looms, assistance to war-torn Ukraine has become politically contested in the US Congress.

According to Republican US House of Representatives Speaker Mike Johnson, voting on the proposed$95billion aid package to Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan was not urgent. Furthermore, on February 10, Trumpsaidat a campaign rally that he would “encourage” the Russians to do “whatever the hell they want” with NATOallies that did not spend enough on their military.

6. 难以捉摸的印度洋-太平洋联盟：地理位置为何重要（The Elusive Indo-PacificCoalition: Why Geography Matters）

Kelly A. Grieco，史汀生中心“重新构想美国大战略”项目高级研究员

Jennifer Kavanagh，卡内基国际和平基金会美国国策项目高级研究员

【摘要】作为 2020 年的总统候选人，乔·拜登誓言他的政府将“让美国回到谈判桌的首位”，准备“与盟友和伙伴合作，动员集体行动应对全球威胁”。在对抗中国的问题上，这一承诺不仅仅是说说而已：拜登政府进行了大量投资，以重申美国在印度洋-太平洋地区的军事优势，加强并扩大与地区盟国和伙伴的安全关系，但同时也使美国坚定而果断地处于主导地位。正如作者今年早些时候所论述的，拜登政府与之前的政府一样，仍然致力于维护美国在印太地区的主导地位。但与其前任美国优先、单打独斗的方针不同，拜登默认单极时代已经结束，维持美国主导地位的代价比过去更高，因此他把加强地区联盟和伙伴关系作为其方针的基石。美国政府的对华战略旨在积极领导一批愿意帮助承担维持美国在印太地区军事主导地位成本的盟友和伙伴，通过联盟支持人为地支撑美国的地区主导地位。【原文】Writing as a presidential candidate in 2020, Joe Biden vowed that his administration would“placethe United States back at the head of the table,” ready to “work with its allies and partners to mobilizecollective action on global threats.” When it came to confronting China, this promise was more thanmerewords: his administration has invested extensively to reassert US military supremacy in the Indo-Pacific,

strengthening and expanding security ties with regional allies and partners but also keeping the UnitedStatesfirmly and decisively in the lead. As we argued earlier this year, the Biden administration, like those beforeit, remains committed to US primacy in the Indo-Pacific. But unlike his predecessor’s America-First,

go-it-alone approach, in a tacit acknowledgement that the unipolar moment has ended and that sustainingUSprimacy is costlier than in the past, Biden has made strengthening regional alliances and partnershipsacornerstone of his approach. The administration’s China strategy aims to actively lead a group of allies andpartners willing to help underwrite the costs of maintaining US military dominance in the Indo-Pacific,

artificially propping up US regional primacy with coalition support.

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7. 印太地区的拜登经济学：战略意义（Bidenomics in the Indo-Pacific: StrategicImplications）

Jeffrey Reeves，美国和平外交研究所华盛顿高级研究员、海军研究生院海军战争学院国家安全副教授【摘要】拜登政府经常被指责在其印太战略中缺乏一个完善的经济组成部分，这一缺陷迫使其过度依赖军事活动、伙伴关系和接触来实施其地区外交政策。这种对美国战略的批评至少可以追溯到对奥巴马政府“亚洲支点”的争论，而在特朗普政府 2017 年决定让美国退出跨太平洋伙伴关系协定（TPP）之后，这种批评的势头更加猛烈。特别是自 2016 年以来，华盛顿在经济上“缺席”亚洲是一种战略上的不利之处的观点已成为美国政策和学术界有关该地区文章中无可争议的自明之理。【原文】The Biden administration is often accused of lacking a well-formulated economic component toitsIndo-Pacific strategy, a deficiency that forces it to rely disproportionately on military activities, partnershipsand engagements to implement its regional foreign policy. Traceable to at least debates over the Obamaadministration’s “pivot to Asia,” this criticism of US strategy gathered steam following the Trumpadministration’s 2017 decision to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.

Since 2016 in particular, the idea that Washington’s economic “absence” from Asia is a strategic liabilityhasbecome an undisputed truism in American policy and academic writing on the region.

8. 有限的杠杆作用：韩国联盟谈判中的核潜伏期（Limited Leverage: Nuclear LatencyinSouth Korea’s Alliance Bargaining）

Ankit Panda，卡内基国际和平基金会核政策项目斯坦顿高级研究员

Tristan A. Volpe，美国海军研究生院国防分析助理教授、卡内基国际和平基金会非常驻研究员【摘要】2023 年春，韩国似乎在利用获取原子武器的威胁来支持美国的国防承诺。这一讨价还价策略在华盛顿和首尔准备进行高级别国事访问时凸显出来。2023 年 1 月 11 日，韩国总统尹锡悦公开表示，首尔可能会获得自己的核武库，以对抗朝鲜的战略力量，成为自 20 世纪80 年代末韩国向民主过渡以来第一位公开考虑获取核武器的韩国领导人。尹锡悦提到了首尔的“先进科学技术”，暗示获取核武器并非痴人说梦，而是一个可信的选择。但尹锡悦也表示，这一前景取决于即将到来的联盟谈判结果，包括 2023 年 4 月的双边峰会，并指出“目前”首尔满足于依靠美国的延伸威慑保证。换句话说，他暗示除非华盛顿认真对待首尔提出的额外安全保证要求，否则韩国可能别无选择，只能制造原子弹。

【原文】In the spring of 2023, South Korea appeared to use the threat of acquiring atomic weapons toshoreup defense commitments from the United States. This bargaining strategy came to the fore as Washingtonand Seoul prepared for a high-level state visit. On January 11, 2023, President Yoon Suk-yeol publiclymused that Seoul might acquire its own nuclear arsenal to counter North Korea’s strategic forces, becomingthe first South Korean leader to openly contemplate nuclear weapons acquisition since the country’stransition to democracy in the late 1980s. In doing so, Yoon referenced Seoul’s “advanced scienceandtechnology,” implying that nuclear weapons acquisition was not a pipe dream but a credible option. But

Yoon also made this prospect conditional on the outcome of upcoming alliance negotiations, includingan

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April 2023 bilateral summit, noting that “for now” Seoul was content to rely on US extended deterrenceassurances. In other words, unless Washington took Seoul's demands for additional security assurancesseriously, he implied, South Korea might be left with no option but to build the bomb.

9. 言行一致：日本国家安全战略一周年（When Actions Match Words: Japan’s National

Security Strategy at One Year）

Christopher B. Johnstone，战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）高级顾问和日本问题主席【摘要】2022 年 12 月，日本发布了新的国家安全和防卫战略，在纸面上承诺进行前所未有的变革。这些战略强调，日本的安全环境“自二战结束以来前所未有的严峻和复杂”，计划到2027 年将待防御能力提高 60%以上；投资于力量投射能力，如远程精确巡航导弹和“积极的网络防御”；大力加强日本国内的国防工业基础，使其“实际上本身就是一种防御能力”。新的国防战略包括加强自卫队能力的计划，以实现“高度战备和反应能力......能够适应新的战争方式”。总体而言，这些公告似乎打破了日本在二战后的大部分时间里一直实行的政策规范，包括将国防开支非正式地限制在国内生产总值的 1%，长期以来对远程导弹和轰炸机等投射能力的限制，以及对向海外转让防卫装备的严格限制。这些声明共同反映了日本战略规划者的判断，即当今的安全威胁需要一种根本不同的国防态势——“今天的乌克兰可能就是明天的东亚”。

【 原 文 】 In December 2022, Japan issued new national security and defense strategies that onpaper

promised unprecedented change. Emphasizing that Japan’s security environment is “as severe and complexas it has ever been since the end of World War II,” the strategies set out plans to increase defenses pendingby more than 60 percent by 2027; invest in power projection capabilities such as long-range precisioncruisemissiles and “active cyber defense”; and significantly strengthen Japan's domestic defense industrial baseas ”virtually a defense capability itself.” The new National Defense Strategy included plans to strengthenthecapacity of the Self Defense Forces to achieve a “high readiness and response capability... able to adapt tonew ways of warfare.” Collectively these announcements appeared to shatter numerous policy norms that

had been in place for much of Japan’s post-World War II history, including the informal cap on defensespending at 1 percent of GDP, longstanding limits on power-projection capabilities such as long-rangemissiles and bombers, and tight constraints on the transfer of defense equipment overseas. Theseannouncements collectively reflected the judgement of Japanese strategic planners that today’s securitythreats demanded a fundamentally different defense posture—that “Ukraine today could be East Asiatomorrow”. 【编译：宋欣蔚】【责任编辑：严瑾怡】

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《太平洋评论》（The Pacific Review）The Pacific Review，Vol. 37, No. 3, 2024

1. 英国在亚太地区的新自由贸易协定：英国在多大程度上采纳了美国的贸易法规？（The UK’s new free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific: how closely is it adoptingUStrade regulation?）

Christopher M. Dent，英国奥姆斯柯克边山大学商学院国际商务系教授

【摘要】在一个日益被贸易的新发展和复杂性所定义的全球经济和体系中，由谁制定规则和法规至关重要。英国已开始实施新的脱欧后贸易政策，与澳大利亚和新西兰签署了首个全新的自由贸易协定（FTA）。英国还正在就加入《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》（CPTPP）进行谈判，这部分上是英国希望成为亚太贸易共同体不可分割的一部分的愿望。本文对英国与澳大利亚和新西兰签订的双边自由贸易协定进行研究和文本分析，结果表明，这两项协定与深受美国贸易监管规范影响的两项大型区域性协定，即 CPTPP 本身和《美国-墨西哥-加拿大协定》（USMCA）高度相似。英国所表现出的与美国贸易监管规范保持高度一致的意愿对亚太地区有重要影响。这也提出了一些关键问题，即英国脱欧后的“全球英国”可能会成为亚太地区怎样的贸易伙伴，以及英国与亚太地区更深入的接触计划会如何影响其战略动态。这在很大程度上取决于随着时间的推移，英国在多大程度上被拉入美国的贸易监管轨道。

【原文】In a global economy and system increasingly defined by new developments and complexities intrade, whose rules and regulations govern that trade matter. The UK has embarked on a newpost-Brexit

trade policy, signing its first wholly new free trade agreements (FTAs) with Australia and NewZealand. It isalso in negotiations to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as part of

the UK’s aspirations to become an integral part of the Asia-Pacific trading community. This study’s research《太平洋评论》（The Pacific Review）是太平洋地区研究的主要平台，作为跨学科期刊，其宗旨和目标为打破研究领域之间以及学术界、新闻界、政府和商界之间的壁垒，重点关注政策问题。根据 Journal Citation Reports 显示，2021

年该刊的影响因子为 2.074。

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and text analysis on the UK’s bilateral FTAs with Australia and New Zealand reveals high levels of

similarity with two larger regional agreements heavily imprinted with US trade regulatory norms—this beingthe CPTPP itself and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA). The UK’s revealedwillingness to strongly align itself with US trade regulatory norms has important implications for theAsia-Pacific. It also raises some key issues on what kind of trade partner the region might expect apost-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ to become, and how the UK’s deeper planned engagement with the Asia-Pacificcould affect its strategic dynamics. This could significantly depend on how closely the UKis pulledover

time into the US’ trade regulatory orbit.

2. 国家为何进行网络安全能力建设援助？——来自日本的证据（Why do states engagein cybersecurity capacity-building assistance? Evidence from Japan）Benjamin Bartlett，美国俄亥俄州牛津迈阿密大学政治学系副教授

【摘要】2009 年，日本开始对东南亚进行网络安全能力建设援助。根据现有文献，日本这样做可能有三个动机。一是加强其经济安全，即或通过推广本国网络安全公司，或通过降低其供应链和其公司所依赖的区域基础设施的风险。二是面对崛起的中国，加强与东南亚的外交和安全关系。三是根据其新宣布的“价值观导向外交”，推广网络空间使用规范。通过研究最初几年日本提供的网络安全能力建设援助的性质，以及相关的政府声明和文件，本文发现，日本与东盟成员国开展网络安全能力建设援助的主要目的是为其企业维持稳定的经济环境。这证明，尽管日本在 2000 年代进行了旨在鼓励利用外援来实现更广泛的地缘政治目标的改革，但在某些领域，经济安全仍是日本对外援助的主要驱动力。研究还表明，虽然网络安全能力建设援助是一种安全合作形式，但不能认为传统的安全关切是其驱动力。

【原文】In 2009, Japan began to engage in cybersecurity capacity-building assistance in Southeast Asia.

Based on existing literature, there are three plausible motives for Japan to have done so. The first was tostrengthen its economic security, either by promoting its own cybersecurity firms or by reducing risks toitssupply chain and the regional infrastructure upon which its firms relied. The second was to strengthendiplomatic and security ties with Southeast Asia in the face of a rising China. The third was to promotenorms regarding the use of cyberspace in line with its newly-declared “values oriented diplomacy”. Byexamining both the nature of the assistance given in the first few years and government statements anddocuments surrounding the decision to provide assistance, this article finds that Japan engagedincybersecurity capacity-building assistance with ASEAN member-states primarily to maintain a stableeconomic environment for its firms. This is evidence that, despite reforms made in Japan during the 2000smeant to encourage the use of foreign aid to pursue wider geopolitical goals, in some areas economicsecurity continued to be a major driver of Japanese foreign aid. These findings also highlight that whilecybersecurity capacity-building assistance is a form of security cooperation, it cannot be assumedthat

traditional security concerns are what is driving it.

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3. 蒙古成为永久中立国？聚焦永久中立国政策的辩论与挑战（Mongolia becomingapermanent neutral nation? Focusing on the debate and challenges of the permanentneutral nation policy）

Jaehyuk Jang，韩国外国语大学（HUFS）蒙古语系

Kisun Kim，韩国外国语大学（HUFS）蒙古语系

【摘要】蒙古发现自己逐渐面临在乌克兰问题上支持俄罗斯的压力，以及在中日南海争端中支持中国的压力。在这种情况下，对于一个小国而言，选边站队的代价将及其高昂。偏袒任何一方都会让一个小国付出巨大代价。然而，自 2015 年 9 月蒙古国总统额勒贝格道尔吉及其外交政策团队在国内外发起将“永久中立”地位制度化的运动以来，乌兰巴托的外交政策专家们一直在激烈争论蒙古国是否应该制定这一政策。最终，2020 年 5 月 6 日，蒙古政府通过第 162 号决议，决定“2015 年9 月批准的第 375 号决议无效，我们将采取措施不推进蒙古国有关永久中立国的政策”。由于担心蒙古国推行永久中立国政策最终会大幅降低其多支柱外交政策的灵活性，蒙古国政府宣布其永久中立国政策无效。【原文】Mongolia found itself increasingly under pressure to back Russia over Ukraine and China initsdisputes with Japan and in the South China Sea. In this emerging scenario, taking sides would be extremelycostly for a small state. However, since September 2015, when Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj

and his foreign policy team launched a campaign both domestically and abroad to institutionalizea‘permanent neutrality’ status, foreign policy pundits in Ulaanbaatar had been intensively debating whether or

not Mongolia should enact such a policy. But finally, on May 6, 2020, the Mongolian government decidedthat ‘Resolution No. 375 ratified in September 2015 will be nullified, and we will take measures not topromote Mongolia’s policies related to a permanent neutral nation’ through resolution No. 162. As theconcern that Mongolia's promotion of the permanent neutral nation policy could eventually significantlyreduce the flexibility of its multi-pillar foreign policy, the Mongolian government nullified its permanent

neutral nation policy.

4. 领土争端、领导人角色和“四方安全对话”的影响：中印边界冲突升级的三角解释（ Territorial disputes, the role of leaders and the impact of Quad: a triangularexplanation of China-India border escalations）

Ghulam Ali，四川轻化工大学马克思主义学院政治学系副教授

【摘要】本文对近期中印边境冲突升级的三方原因进行了解释。文章认为，虽然冲突升级源于边界争议（第一个因素），但另外两个因素，即中印两国的政策以及“四方安全对话”（Quad）的国际政治影响，也引发了局势升级。在过去几十年中，这三个因素并非同时发挥作用。各种事件的巨大推动力将三者联系在一起，一方的发展影响着另外两方。文章解释了不同因素和子因素之间的联系及其相互促进的作用。边界不明确为冲突提供了基础。中印双方的强硬政策从五个方面挑起了竞争：影响力竞争、地位竞争、军事化、实际控制线（LAC）的变化以及援引“四方安全对话”。文章随后阐述了印度在制衡中国方面的超强战略优势，以及“中国因素”在双边和四方机制下加强印度与美国、日本和澳大利亚的关系。当代中印竞争已超越了有争议的边界。国内和国际政治已开始对其产生影响，使其成为亚洲最重要的地缘政治挑战。

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【原文】This article provides a triangular explanation of the recent surge in China-Indian border escalations.

It argues that although escalations stemmed from the disputed borders (the first factor), two additional

factors, the policies of new nationalist leaders Xi and Modi and the impact of international politics withtheQuadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) as a case study, also triggered them. In the preceding decades, thesethree factors were not operational simultaneously. A grand push of events connected themin a waythat

developments on one side affected the other two. The article explained the linkages between different factorsand subfactors and their reinforcing interplay. The ill-defined boundary provided a foundation for theconflict. The assertive policies of Xi and Modi provoked the rivalry in five ways: competition for influence,

status, militarisation, changes in the line of actual control (LAC), and invocation of the Quad. The articlethen elaborated India’s unrivalled strategic advantages in balancing China and how the ‘China factor’ strengthened India’s ties with the US, Japan and Australia bilaterally and under the Quad. The contemporarySino-Indian rivalry has expanded beyond disputed borders. Domestic and international politics have startedinfluencing it, making it Asia’s foremost geopolitical challenge.

5. 台美防扩散合作：朝鲜案例与受影响产业的影响（Taiwan–US nonproliferationcooperation: the case of North Korea and the influence of affected industrie）Yi-hao Su，国立台湾大学政治学系副教授

【摘要】为什么美国发现很难获得第三方对其防扩散政策的承诺？虽然美国的压力是促使政策实施的必要条件，但本文认为，当受影响的行业预见到目标收益不断增加并对执政党显示出强大的影响力时，行为体的反应就会减弱。作者通过对 1992 年以来美台在朝鲜问题上的防扩散合作进行个案内部研究来检验这一论点。根据访谈、官方统计数据和维基解密文件，本研究发现，由于机械行业对朝鲜的出口量不断增加，加之强大的政治影响力，中国台湾当局将美国要求的针对机械行业违规者的执法行动推迟到了 2006 年。相比之下，由于与朝鲜的能源贸易和金融交易极少，中国台湾当局在1997 年迅速停止了核废料处理计划，并在 21 世纪加强了金融制裁。这些发现填补了关于对第三方实施制裁的政治成本的理论空白，并丰富了防扩散承诺的学术研究。当前的政策含义是，中国台湾的高科技产业可能会更强烈地反对美国要求管制与中国的半导体产品贸易。

【 原 文 】 Why does the United States find it challenging to obtain third-party commitment toitsnonproliferation policies? Although US pressure is necessary to trigger implementation, I contend that statesare less responsive when the affected industries foresee growing gains from targets and displaystrongleverage on the ruling parties. I tested this argument by conducting a within-case study on US–Taiwanesenonproliferation cooperation concerning North Korea since 1992. On the basis of interviews, official

statistics, and Wikileaks documents, this study revealed that because of the machinery industry’s increasingexport volume to North Korea and strong political influence, Taiwan delayed United States–requestedenforcement actions against the machinery industry’s violators until 2006. By contrast, because of minimal

energy trade and financial transactions with North Korea, Taiwan swiftly halted a nuclear waste disposal

plan in 1997 and improved financial sanctions in the 21st century. These findings fill the theoretical gapregarding the political costs of sanction enforcement on third-party states and add to the scholarshipon