《国际关系前沿》2024年第5期(总第17期)

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《国际关系前沿》2024年第5期(总第17期)

2024 年第5 期(总第17期)145light of their successes before the dissolution of the USSR, offers new insights into the effectiveness of greenpolitics in the Russian provinces prior to the disintegration of the USSR. 7. 摩尔多瓦、拉脱维亚大清洗和赫鲁晓夫的代际斗争(1958—1962)(Moldova, theLatvian Purges and Khrushchev’s Generational Struggle, 1958–1962)William D. Prigge,南达科塔州立大学历史学教授Marius Tăríţă,独立研究员【摘要】苏联历史学家越来越多地将目光转向看似平静的 1958—1962 年。这一时期各加盟共和国高层领导的更替早已为人所熟知,但这些变化的原因及其程度仍不清楚。本研究考察了各共和国中央委员会的更替率,并以摩尔多瓦和拉脱维亚为案例进行研究。我们得出结论,变化的... [收起]
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《国际关系前沿》2024年第5期(总第17期)
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中国国际关系学界最大的学术编译平台,专注国内外权威杂志前沿学术动态。受众定位高水平研究者,目前已覆盖国内本领域所有科研院校。联系:guozhengxueren@163.com
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light of their successes before the dissolution of the USSR, offers new insights into the effectiveness of greenpolitics in the Russian provinces prior to the disintegration of the USSR. 7. 摩尔多瓦、拉脱维亚大清洗和赫鲁晓夫的代际斗争(1958—1962)(Moldova, theLatvian Purges and Khrushchev’s Generational Struggle, 1958–1962)William D. Prigge,南达科塔州立大学历史学教授

Marius Tăríţă,独立研究员

【摘要】苏联历史学家越来越多地将目光转向看似平静的 1958—1962 年。这一时期各加盟共和国高层领导的更替早已为人所熟知,但这些变化的原因及其程度仍不清楚。本研究考察了各共和国中央委员会的更替率,并以摩尔多瓦和拉脱维亚为案例进行研究。我们得出结论,变化的根本原因是取代老一代人的愿望。更常见的解释是针对民族主义者,但这实际上是守旧派的后卫行动,他们减缓了但未能阻止这一变化。

【原文】Historians of the Soviet Union have increasingly turned their attention to the seemingly quiet yearsof 1958–1962. Turnover in top leadership within the republics has long been noted, but the causes of thesechanges and their extent are still not precisely known. This study examines turnover rates for eachof therepublic central committees, then uses Moldova and Latvia as case studies. We conclude that the root causeof the change was a desire to replace the older generation. The targeting of nationalists, the more usual

explanation, was in fact a rearguard action by the old guard, which slowed but did not stop the shift. 【编译:邹梓轩周杼樾】【责任编辑:严瑾怡】

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《地中海政治》(Mediterranean Politics)Mediterranean Politics,Vol. 29, No. 4, 2024

1. 向代理人提供安全援助--阿联酋如何确保其地区目标的实现(Security assistancetosurrogates–how the UAE secures its regional objectives)

Andreas Krieg,伦敦国王学院安全研究学院副教授

【摘要】在西方自由主义国家于中东地区相对后撤的战略背景下,阿拉伯联合酋长国承担了部分地区安全援助的责任——这重新定义了安全援助的规范和做法。与西方国家不同,阿联酋正在投入对利比亚或也门的安全援助。与其说这是在海外建立国家和国家的一种手段,不如说是作为一种建立网络的手段,使小国能够在不附加任何规范性条件的情况下投射影响力和权力。更重要的是,阿联酋通过代理人提供安全援助,作为一种独立的外交方略,使阿布扎比能够在看似合理的拒绝下参与海外竞争。其中许多代理人不仅挑战了国家对暴力的垄断,而且通过创造其他形式的以安全部门为基础的治理,最终破坏了合法的政府机构。总之,阿联酋的安全援助方式建立在分而治之的基础上,建立了非常强大的代理人网络,以确保竞争对手无法确保自己的利益。

【 原 文 】 Amid a relative withdrawal of western, liberal states from the Middle East, the UnitedArabEmirates have taken over some of the burden of regional security assistance–doing so redefining norms andpractices of security assistance. Unlike western counterparts, the UAE are investing into security assistancein Libya or Yemen, not so much as a means of state and nation-building overseas, but as means of buildingnetworks allowing the small state to project influence and power with few normative strings attached. Moreso, the UAE deliver security assistance via surrogates as discrete means of statecraft allowing Abu Dhabi tocompete overseas with plausible deniability. Many of these surrogates do not only challenge the state’smonopoly over violence but ultimately undermine legitimate government institutions by creating alternativeforms of security sector-based governance. Ultimately, the UAE’s approach to security assistance is basedon divide-and-rule, ripening particularly potent networks of surrogates over others to ensure that competitorsare unable to secure their interests.

《地中海政治》(Mediterranean Politics)是一本汇集了地中海及其周边地区当代政治和国际关系研究的学术期刊。地中海不仅被理解为那些边界部分或全部由海洋本身界定的国家,而且被理解为一个跨越欧洲、非洲和亚洲大陆的空间。因此,该刊寻求作为相关区域研究团体之间的桥梁,文章范围包括更广泛的欧洲、非洲、中东和西亚地区的国家和人口。该刊近五年影响因子为 2.266。

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2. 安全援助在突尼斯过渡进程中的重塑作用(The role of security assistance inreconfiguring Tunisia’s transition)

Rosa Maryon,西英格兰大学高级讲师

【摘要】在地中海的许多情况下,安全援助被认为是导致国家分裂或长期冲突的原因。相反,在突尼斯,安全援助提高了安全部队在反恐和移民控制方面的表现和能力。然而,本文通过分析安全援助重新排序的影响,认为其与政治发展相互作用,以两种方式重新配置突尼斯动荡的政治格局。首先,安全援助方案加强了突尼斯安全部队对一般民众的强制能力。其次,垂直安全实践有助于突尼斯安全部门不同行动者之间权力动态的重新配置,有助于巩固行政部门日益独裁的权力,以及日益政治化的安全部队。此外,本文的最后一部分将反思安全援助、突尼斯政治经济和许多提供国的经济利益之间的纠缠。并在此过程中提出了在分析地中海外部干预措施时将安全研究与政治经济学“重新挂钩”的缘由,以更好地理解其重新排序的影响。

【原文】In many contexts in the Mediterranean, Security Assistance (SA) is perceived to have contributedtostate fracture or prolonged conflict. In Tunisia, in contrast, SA has increased the performance and capacitiesof the security forces in matters of counterterrorism and migration control. However, in this article, byanalysing SA’s reordering impacts, I argue that it has interacted with political developments to reconfigureTunisia’s volatile political landscape in two ways. Firstly, SA programmes have acted to reinforcethecoercive capacities of Tunisia’s security forces vis-à-vis the general population. Secondly, vertical SApractices contributed to the reconfiguration of power dynamics between different actors in Tunisia’s securitysector, helping consolidate power in the increasingly authoritarian hands of the executive as well as theincreasingly politicized security forces. Furthermore, in the final section of this article, I reflect upontheentanglements between security assistance, Tunisian political economy and the economic interests of manyprovider states. In doing so, I make the case for a ‘recoupling’ of security studies and political economyinanalysis of external interventions in the Mediterranean to better understand their reordering impacts. 3. 对手和陌生伙伴的形成:土耳其和俄罗斯在叙利亚和利比亚内战中的安全援助模式(The making of rivals and strange bedfellows: Patterns of Turkish and Russiansecurityassistance in the Syrian and Libyan civil wars)

Abdullah Al-Jabassini,欧洲大学学院研究员

Emadeddin Badi,大西洋理事会中东项目非驻地高级研究员

【摘要】在利比亚和叙利亚内战中,俄罗斯和土耳其成为向交战双方提供安全援助的两个主要角色。虽然这两个外国势力的干预为棘手和动荡的武装冲突带来了新的动力,但其根本目的是为正在进行的冲突注入外来目标,并在地中海南部地区投射力量。本文从理论和实证角度对安全援助进行了研究。在理论层面,本文提出了一种类型学,区分了国家-非国家层面的正式、非正式和半正式的战时安全援助过程。在实证层面,通过与叙利亚和利比亚的国家官员、前叛军和现役叛军以及雇佣军进行罕见的接触,本文对俄罗斯和土耳其向国家和非国家武装行动者提供安全援助的模式进行了独特的描述性分析。本文考察了这两个外国势力如何利用叙利亚已有的安全援助框架,在利比亚招募和部署战斗人

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员,从而在两场冲突之间建立联系。尽管安全援助已成为俄罗斯和土耳其之间的竞争场所,但本文展示了相互承认安全利益如何为叙利亚和利比亚的谈判和达成协议创造了空间。【原文】In the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, Russia and Turkey emerged as two principal players providingsecurity assistance to opposing warring parties. While interventions on the part of the two foreign powershave introduced new dynamics into intractable and volatile armed conflicts, the underlying intentionwas toinject extraneous goals into ongoing conflicts and project power in the southern Mediterranean region. Thisarticle investigates security assistance theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, we propose a typologythat distinguishes between formal, informal and semi-formal processes of wartime security assistance acrossthe state-non-state dimension. Empirically, drawing on rare access to state officials, former and active rebels, as well as mercenary actors in Syria and Libya, we give a unique description of the patterns of securityassistance provided by Russia and Turkey to state and non-state armed actors. We examine the ways inwhich the two foreign powers have created a nexus between the two conflicts by capitalizing on pre-existingsecurity assistance frameworks in Syria to recruit and deploy fighters to Libya. Although security assistancehas emerged as a competition site between Russia and Turkey, we demonstrate how mutual recognitionof

security interests has created margins for negotiation and agreement-reaching in Syria and Libya. 4. 可处置的叛军:美国在叙利亚战争中对叛军的军事援助(Disposable rebels: USmilitary assistance to insurgents in the Syrian war)

Øystein H. Rolandsen,挪威奥斯陆和平研究所教授

Kjetil Selvik,挪威国际事务研究所教授

【摘要】在叙利亚战争期间,美国等西方国家为叙利亚反政府武装提供训练、装备和资金,帮助他们对抗政府,后来又铲除了“伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国”(ISIL)。当国家利用武装组织实现外交政策目标时,控制是一个关键问题。在 2013 至 2018 年期间,美国试图对致命军事援助的提供者和接受者实施这种控制。本文调查了中央情报局和国防部并行的援助方案。对应用委托代理模型解释外国援助叛军动态的理论假设提出了质疑。本文认为在美国控制叛军的战略中,协调安全援助的提供者和划分受援者是必要条件。与此同时,招募工作的延误、受训士兵人数的限制、武器供应的短缺以及对叛军行动的严格监管都降低了援助的效力。这种利用安全援助的方式帮助美国及其西方盟友击溃了伊斯兰国,同时避免了大马士革的崩溃。然而,这是以牺牲叛军的凝聚力、自主性和合法性为代价的。【原文】During the Syrian War, the US and other Western countries trained, equipped and paid Syrianrebels to fight the government and, later, root out the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Whenstates use armed groups to attain foreign policy objectives, control is a key concern. The US sought toenforce such control over providers and recipients of lethal military assistance in the period from2013–18. We investigate the parallel CIA and Department of Defence assistance programmes . We challengetheoretical assumptions related to the application of the principal-agent model to explain the dynamics of

foreign assistance to rebels. We argue that, in the US strategy to control rebels, co-ordinating the providersand dividing the recipients of security assistance were essential conditions. Meanwhile, the delays inrecruitment, the limitations on the number of soldiers trained, the short supply of weapons and the strict

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regulation of the actions carried out by the rebels all reduced the efficacy of the assistance. This wayof

instrumentalising security assistance helped the US and its Western allies to crush ISIL while avoidingacollapse in Damascus. However, this happened at the expense of rebel cohesion, autonomy, and legitimacy. 5. 走向非西方的安全援助模式:伊朗如何援助军队(Towards a non-Westernmodel ofsecurity assistance: How Iran assists militaries)

Abdolrasool Divsallar ,米兰圣心天主教大学经济与国际关系研究生院兼职教授Hamidreza Azizi,德国柏林科学与政治基金会非洲与中东研究部访问研究员【摘要】随着 1979 年革命的爆发,伊朗的安全援助(SA)经历了重大转变,从革命后早期以意识形态为导向的对伊斯兰运动的零散支持转变为将安全援助作为国家安全战略的核心。本文通过探讨以下关键问题来思考伊朗的安全援助模式:革命后伊朗战略思维中对安全保障及其作用的认识发生了怎样的变化?伊朗战略安全实践的关键要素是什么?在援助当地军事伙伴方面是否存在“伊朗方式”,在多大程度上与其他国家的类似做法重叠?论文指出了两个阶段的演变过程,认为战略援助逐渐演变为一种战略工具,用于建立德黑兰领导的地区联盟模式、增强伊朗的威慑能力以及对抗美国领导的集体安全架构。德黑兰以意识形态和反帝国主义的混合理念为核心,依靠人与人之间的纽带和个人忠诚,将非对称行动与持续的兵力投送相结合,并采用集中式指挥结构,将公开性降到最低,从而推出了一种独特的安全援助模式。本文展示了伊朗如何超越对安全援助的技术性看法,逐步形成了一个交织着救世主式、经济和战略维度的整体模式。

【原文】With the 1979 revolution, Iran’s Security Assistance (SA) underwent a significant transformation, from fragmented and ideologically-driven support for Islamic movements in the early post-revolutionarystage to making SA the centrepiece of its national security strategy. This article explores Iran' model of SAby addressing the following key questions: How have perceptions of SA and its role in post-revolutionaryIran’s strategic thinking changed? What constitutes key elements of the Iranian SA practice? Is therean‘Iranian way' of assisting local military partners, and to what extent does it overlap with other states’ similar

practices? The paper identifies a two-stage process of evolution, arguing that SA gradually evolvedintoastrategic tool to build a Tehran-led regional alliance model, boost Iran’s deterrence capability, and counter

the US-led collective security architecture. With a hybrid ideological and anti-imperialist rationale at its core, relying on human bonds and personal loyalties, mixing asymmetric operations with sustainedforceprojection, and using a centralized command structure with minimum public exposure, Tehranhasintroduced a unique model of security assistance. The paper shows how Iran has moved beyond a technical

view of SA to gradually shape a holistic model with interwoven messianic, economic, and strategicdimensions. 6. 地中海大象:后殖民性与欧洲安全援助实践(The elephant in the med: Postcolonialityand European security assistance practices)

Simone Tholens ,意大利约翰·卡波特大学国际关系副教授

Chiara Ruffa,巴黎政治学院国际研究中心教授

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【摘要】本文探讨了地中海地区的一个重大问题:欧洲安全援助对全球后殖民秩序延续的影响。本文指出了安全援助的三种核心做法,它们为后殖民解读提供了依据:从外部制造“问题”并设计要解决的“方案”;将“援助方”和“受援方”联系在物质依赖关系中;以及作为“薄”调整而非“厚”抵抗的争论。与功能主义的主张相反,本文在当代欧洲安全援助实践中观察到的情况与后殖民逻辑是一致的,后殖民逻辑产生了独特的主体性并复制了不平等的模式。欧洲国家--无论是否为前殖民国家--利用安全援助以等级方式构建世界。本文认为,安全援助主要不是为了战略效果,而是为了显示优越性、再现依赖性和殖民化/殖民化心态。此外,安全援助实践揭示了安全援助的必要性--即欧洲安全援助的存在往往与不安全纠缠在一起,因此,安全援助实践使安全援助的必要性显而易见--这是一种自我生产的证成性,就像从殖民剧本中摘录的一样。本文从英国、法国、意大利和瑞典在利比亚和黎巴嫩提供安全援助的方式中汲取灵感,探索其运作的构成过程。

【 原 文 】 This article explores an enormous elephant in the Mediterranean space: European securityassistance’s impact on the continuation of a global postcolonial order. We identify three core practices of

security assistance that provides for postcolonial readings: externally producing ‘the problem’ and designing‘the solutions’ to be tackled; linking the ‘provider’ and ‘recipients’ in material dependencies; andcontestation as ‘thin’ adjustments rather than ‘thick’ resistance. Contrary to claims of functionalism, what weobserve in contemporary European security assistance practice is consistent with postcolonial logics that

produce distinct subjectivities and reproduce patterns of inequalities. European states – whether former

colonial powers or not –use security assistance to structure the world in hierarchical ways. We arguethat

security assistance is not primarily about strategic effects but principally about signalling superiorityandreproducing dependencies and colonizing/colonised mentalities. Moreover, security assistance practicesreveal the need for security assistance–i.e. European SA presence often gets entangled with insecurity, andas such, security assistance practice makes the need for security assistance visible – a self-producingevidentiality that is as taken out of the colonial playbook. The paper explores constitutive processes at workby drawing on insights from British, French, Italian and Swedish approaches to security assistance inLibyaand Lebanon. 7. 地中海马什里克和马格里布地区的安全援助、安全化、安全体系和不安全状况(Security assistance, securitization, security systems, and insecurity in the

Mediterranean mashriq and maghreb)

Robert Springborg,加拿大西蒙弗雷泽大学国际研究学院兼职教授

【摘要】中东和北非(其中地中海南部和东部次区域占人口和领土的大部分)是世界上安全化程度最高的地区,也是接受安全援助最多的地区,但却是全球安全程度最低的国家。与此相关的一个悖论是,虽然该地区的国家是世界上最不民主的国家,但其大部分安全援助却来自民主国家。本文以这两个悖论的原因和后果为基础,探讨地中海及更广泛的中东和北非地区的安全化、安全体系和不安全之间的关系。这些悖论是历史遗留问题和有限准入秩序的产物,是该地区政治经济的特点。它们是安全援助提供方和接受方之间“浮士德式交易”的主要驱动力,也是这些关系的代价。文章最后回顾了改善安全

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援助成本与收益平衡的提议,建议采取双重战略,即寻求改革受援国的军民关系,同时改变双方在安全援助关系中的军事角色和责任。

【原文】The Middle East and North Africa, of which the southern and eastern Mediterranean sub-regionconstitutes the bulk of the population and territory, is the world’s most securitized region. It is alsotheleading recipient of security assistance but provides the least security of any global region. Arelated paradoxis that this region, the states of which are the world’s least democratic, receives the bulk of its securityassistance from democracies. This article draws upon the causes and consequences of these two paradoxes toinvestigate relationships between securitization, security systems, and insecurity in the Mediterraneanandbroader MENA region. These paradoxes are products of historical legacies and limited access orders that

characterize the region’s political economies. They are key drivers of ‘Faustian Bargains’ between providersand recipients of security assistance and the costs of those relationships. The article concludes with a reviewof proposals to improve the balance of costs and benefits of SA, recommending a dual strategy of seekingtoreform recipients’ civil–military relations while changing military roles and responsibilities of both partnersin security assistance relationships. 【编译:马欣茹张潇文】【责任编辑:严瑾怡】

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